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OUR EXISTENTIAL DEATH PENALTY: JUDGES, JURORS, AND
TERROR MANAGEMENT
Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier*
Non mortem timemus, sed cogitati6nem mortis.'
I. INTRODUCTION
For many individuals who see the death penalty as inherently right or
wrong, their positions on the death penalty are not swayed by logical de-
bate. For example, those opposed to the death penalty on moral or reli-
gious grounds are not moved by a discussion of any arguable benefits of
the death penalty over life imprisonment.
On the other side, many in favor of the death penalty are not moved
by problems with the capital punishment system. Thus, a majority of
Americans still support the death penalty2despite revelations of innocent
people on death row,3 despite systemic problems and the arbitrary applica-
tion of capital punishment,4 despite claims of recent wrongful executions,5
despite a lack of evidence that the death penalty deters crime more than
* Professor of Law, City University of New York School of Law. J.D., Case Western Reserve
University School of Law, 1989; B.A., Case Western Reserve University, 1984. The author thanks
Dr. Sheldon Solomon and Professor Deborah Zalesne for reviewing an earlier draft. Thanks to Erik
Nelson for research assistance.
1. Lucius Annaeus Seneca, Epistles, 30 (13). The English translation of this quote is "We do
not fear death, but the thought of death."
2. See Gallup Poll. Who Supports the Death Penalty?, available at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?did= 1266&scid=. The phenomena are not completely
unique to the United States, because even though countries have abandoned the death penalty, those
countries often have a solid plurality of citizens who support capital punishment. See Jeffrey L. Kir-
chmeier, Another Place Beyond Here: The Death Penalty Moratorium Movement in the United States
[hereinafter Another Place Beyond Here], 73 COLO. L. REv. 1, 84-88 (2002) (discussing several
countries that abolished the death penalty despite popular support of the death penalty); Kristi Tummi-
nello Prinzo, The United States - "Capital" of the World: An Analysis of Why the United States Prac-
tices Capital Punishment While the International Trend is Towards Its Abolition, 24 BROOK. J. INT'L
L. 855, 887-89 (1999).
3. See generally, e.g., Lawrence C. Marshall, The Innocence Revolution and the Death Penalty,
1 OHIO ST. J. CRLm. L. 573 (2004); Kirchmeier, Another Place Beyond Here, supra note 2, at 39-43.
4. See, e.g., Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Casting a Wider Net: Another Decade of Legislative Expan-
sion of the Death Penalty in the United States [hereinafter Casting a Wider Net], 34 PEPP. L. REV. 1,
34-40 (2006); Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Aggravating and Mitigating Factors: The Paradox of Today's
Arbitrary and Mandatory Capital Punishment Scheme [hereinafter Aggravating and Mitigating Fac-
tors], 6 WM. & MARY BILL RTs J. 345, 345 (1998).
5. See generally, e.g., Symposium. Dead Innocent: The Death Penalty Abolitionist Search for a
Wrongful Execution, 42 TULSA L. REV. 403 (2006).
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life imprisonment, 6 despite racial disparities in the use of the death penal-
ty, 7 despite the fact that governments spend much more to execute some-
one than it would cost to put the person in prison for life, 8 despite a grow-
ing league of judges and others who question the value of capital punish-
ment, 9 and despite an expanding international consensus against counties
killing their citizens as punishment for crimes.' 0
These Americans who support the death penalty are the only members
of society allowed to sit on capital juries. So, for lawyers and legal scho-
lars, the question about why individuals support the death penalty is an
especially important one.
The moral desire to kill heinous killers may exist at our birth or it may
be taught from the time we are children." Professor Walter Wink has
argued that society feeds us stories to perpetrate the myth of redemptive
violence.' 2 We are taught that violence brings redemption and healing
6. See, e.g., Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 615 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring) (noting that
"[s]tudies of deterrence are, at most inconclusive"); John J. & Justin Wolfers, Uses and Abuses of
Empirical Evidence in the Death Penalty Debate, 58 STAN. L. REV. 791, 794 (2005) (examining the
methodology of studies that argue that the death penalty deters more than life imprisonment and con-
cluding there is "profound uncertainty" whether the death penalty has any deterrent effect); Michael
L. Radelet & Ronald L. Akers, Policy and Perspective: Deterrence and the Death Penalty: The Views
of the Experts, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 8 (1996) (finding consensus among criminologists
that research does not show that the death penalty deters). Cf. Hashem Dezhbakhsh et al., Does
Capital Punishment Have a Deterrent Effect? New Evidence from Postmoratorium Panel Data, 5 AM.
L. & ECON. REV. 344, 372-73 (2003).
7. See, e.g., Symposium. Discrimination, Death and Denial: The Tolerance of Racial Discrimi-
nation in Infliction of the Death Penalty, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 433, 461-65 (1995); Kirchmeier,
Another Place Beyond Here, supra note 2, at 90-95.
8. See, e.g., Judge Arthur L. Alarc6n, Remedies for California's Death Row Deadlock, 80 S.
CAL. L. REV. 697, 710 (2007) (noting study on increased costs for trial, post-conviction proceedings
and housing for capital defendants in California versus those serving life sentences); Adam M. Ger-
showitz, Pay Now, Execute Later: Why Counties Should Be Required to Post a Bond to Seek the Death
Penalty, 41 U. RICH. L. REV. 861, 890-91 (2007) (discussing study finding that each death penalty
case costs Texas three times as much as imprisoning someone for forty years and noting similar stu-
dies form California, Florida, Kansas and North Carolina).
9. See, e.g., Kirchmeier, Another Place Beyond Here, supra note 2, at 25-36, 43-48, 53-59
(discussing a large number of judges, politicians, conservatives and other prominent individuals who
have taken a position against the death penalty).
10. See, e.g., AP, Rwanda Calls for End to Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2007 (discuss-
ing strategy of a large number of nations to pursue a United Nations General Assembly resolution for
a worldwide moratorium on executions). "The death penalty is no longer carried out in 130 countries,
including the 27-nation European Union, which has fought for global abolition." Id.
11. In Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 308 (1971), Justice Stewart stated, "The instinct for
retribution of the nature of man."
12. WALTER WINK, THE POWERS THAT BE 42-62 (1999). Professor Wink explained that the
psychodynamics of portrayals of redemptive violence include that cartoons and movies allow viewers
"to project onto the bad guy their own repressed anger, violence, rebelliousness, or lust, and then
vicariously to enjoy their own evil by watching the bad guy initially prevail." Id. at 49. Wink also
connected redemptive violence with scapegoating. Id. at 55-56. Ernest Becker's theories, though, in
addition to explaining scapegoating, also help explain the function of redemptive violence in that these
portrayals allow the viewer to reinforce one's views that death is a controlled actor that only takes the
unjust. See discussion infra Section II.
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through lessons from various sources, including ancient epic tales, 13 car-
toons of heroes destroying villains, 14 and movies such as the American
Western, where a hero avenges an evil gunslinger in a hail of bullets. 15
We enjoy these myths and, similarly, death penalty supporters and even
some death penalty opponents feel an understandable mythic satisfaction
from the concept of the justice of the death penalty. 16
If the desire for redemptive violence is bred and taught to us from
birth, the goal for abolitionists to eliminate the death penalty through edu-
cation may be hopeless. And if American society maintains a death penal-
ty, these influences are present in courtrooms, and attorneys must confront
these influences when they stand before the jurors and judges who favor
the death penalty. Thus, attorneys who seek a full understanding of the
death penalty and the urge for redemptive violence must take an interdis-
ciplinary approach to their work.' 7
13. WINK, supra note 12, at 44-48 (discussing the Babylonian creation story from around 1250
B.C.).
14. For example, where we watch Popeye suffer near defeat but then he consumes spinach to
emerge victorious over Bluto by beating him. Id. at 44.
15. For example, see the recent remake of 3:10 to Yuma (Lionsgate 2007), where Ben Wade
(Russell Crowe) finds redemption when he kills his former gang members. The director emphasizes
that it is a moment of redemption by showing that the act is prompted by Wade looking at his gun
handle, which has the image of Jesus on the cross. Although many westerns show redemption through
violence, not all do, and the original 3:10 to Yuma (Columbia Pictures 1957) did not, and in the classic
movie The Searchers (C.V. Whitney Pictures 1956), Ethan Edwards finds some redemption when he
chooses not to kill. See GARRY WILLS, JOHN WAYNE'S AMERICA 258-59 (1997); WINK, supra note
12, at 50.
16. See, e.g., Symposium, Rethinking the Death Penalty: Can We Define Who Deserves Death?,
24 PACE L. REV. 107, 123-24, 129, 138 (2003). See also SUSAN JACOBY, WILD JUSTICE: THE
EVOLUTION OF REVENGE 289 (1988) (stating that "popular support for capital punishment is grounded
in the conviction that criminals ought to be paid back for their violent deeds").
17. - While advances in science have impacted individual cases, the advances have not significantly
affected the foundation of our legal system. One of the greatest scientific revelations about human
beings was published by Charles Darwin on November 22, 1859 in his On the Origin of Species by
Means of Natural Selection. Yet, except for some initial decisions about social Darwinism that gave
the relationship between human evolution and the law a bad name, this great discovery has had rela-
tively little impact on our great system addressing human relations, our legal system. See Social
Darwinism, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY 829 (Ted Honderich ed. 1995).
Similarly, other advances in understanding human relations have had little impact on how the
law works, even though there have been arguments to look to scientific advances to affect legal theory.
See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, The Curvature of Constitutional Space: What Lawyers Can Learn from
Modern Physics, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1, 23-39 (1989). The law can be resistant to science, as shown
by the fact that despite significant advances in understanding human psychology, the test for the crimi-
nal defense of insanity used in most jurisdictions today is very similar to the one developed in the
early 1800's. See Stanford H. Kadish, Fifty Years of Criminal Law: An Opinionated Review, 87 CAL.
L. REV. 943, 960 (1999).
A risk exists, of course, that a mixture of law and science may be misused. In the early
1900's, Social Darwinism infected some judicial opinions, resulting in Justice Holmes upholding a
compulsory sterilization plan for a "feeble minded" woman with the infamous statement, "[t]hree
generations of imbeciles are enough." Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 205-207 (1927). See Stephen Jay
Gould, Carrie Buck's Daughter, in THE FLAMINGO'S SMILE 307-13 (1985). Some scholars have been
critical of the mixture of science and legal analysis. See generally Laurence H. Tribe, Policy Science:
Analysis or Ideology? 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 66 (1972); Laurence H. Tribe, Seven Deadly Sins of
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Sociologist-anthropologist Ernest Becker, in the spirit of the Enligh-
tenment, argued for an interdisciplinary approach for understanding hu-
mans. 18  Becker combined the ideas of Charles Darwin, Sdren Kierke-
gaard, Otto Rank, and other great scientists and philosophers in his at-
tempts to understand human behavior and why human beings seek violent
solutions to problems.' 9 His theories address the existential problem of
the inevitability of death, our knowledge of that inevitability, our attempts
to give meaning to our finite lives, and the causes of violence.
Becker explained that humans are unique creatures in that we are ani-
mals with an intelligence that provides us with the knowledge of the inevi-
tability of our death. The understanding that one will some day die and
cease to exist on earth is a terror that one must manage. Such an existen-
tial terror is overwhelming if thought about consciously, so human beings
push the fear of death to the subconscious and try to create illusions of
immortality for themselves. 2°
Becker theorized about what happens when people subconsciously
create illusions of immortality and about what happens when one encoun-
ters another who has contrary immortality illusions. Becker reasoned that
our fear of death makes us hostile, and sometimes violent, toward those
who differ from us because they threaten our own immortality illusions.21
These terror management theories provide insight into the legal sys-
tem. In recent years, Becker's theories have been tested by psychologists,
and some experiments have considered effects in courtrooms and found
that reminders of death make judges more punitive toward certain defen-
dants.22 A small but growing number of law review articles that mention
or discuss Becker's theories in the legal context are being published, 23 and
Straining the Constitution Through a Pseudo-Scientific Sieve, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 155 (1984); Laurence
H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329
(1971). Yet, it seems equally dangerous to isolate a segment of human understanding from aiding
legal analysis.
18. See ERNEST BECKER, THE STRUCTURE OF EVIL: AN ESSAY ON THE UNIFICATION OF THE
SCIENCE OF MAN 375-86 (1968).
19. See, e.g., ERNEST BECKER, THE DENIAL OF DEATH 67-124 (1973); ERNEST BECKER, ESCAPE
FROM EVIL 91-95, 142-43 (1975); Sheldon Solomon et al., The Cultural Animal, in HANDBOOK OF
EXPERIMENTAL EXISTENTIAL PSYCHOLOGY 15-16 (Jeff Greenberg, et al. eds., 2004) [hereinafter
"HANDBOOK OF EEP"].
20. See discussion infra Part I.
21. Id.
22. See discussion infra Part II
23. See, e.g., Adam J. Hirsch, Default Rules in Inheritance Law: A Problem in Search of Its
Context, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1031,1049 (2004) (discussing terror management theory in the context
of estate planning to help explain why wealthier people with greater self-esteem are more likely to
execute a will than others); Lee Anne Fennell, Death, Taxes, and Cognition, 81 N.C. L. REV. 567,
584-85 (2003) (applying terror management to inheritance taxation); Donald P. Judges, Scared to
Death: Capital Punishment as Authoritarian Terror Management, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 155, 161-
62 (1999) (addressing terror management as an explanation for the death penalty).
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there are more books and articles in the medical community about how his
theories work in the world.24
Because these terror management theories are tied to human beings'
fear of death, one logical place to apply Becker's theories is in capital cas-
es. 25  Becker's theories help explain why we have the death penalty, why
some jurors may vote for death in some cases but not others, how judges
decide cases, and how the death penalty affects everyone in the capital
punishment system. Attorneys should be aware of ongoing discoveries
that help explain events in the courtroom during capital punishment trials.
This Article's goal is not to provide a definitive psychoanalysis of the
death penalty but to raise questions and ideas that are worthy of further
exploration for members of the legal and psychology communities. Part I
of this Article provides a brief introduction into the existential theories
about the fear of death, discussed, among others, by Ernest Becker. Part
II discusses recent empirical terror management research. Part III gives a
brief overview of the capital punishment system, and Part IV addresses
how terror management affects capital trials. The terror management
theories and experiments provide an important understanding of the sub-
conscious influences upon jurors. Next, Part V considers the post-trial
terror management impacts on other participants in the legal system such
as judges, attorneys and defendants. Part VI suggests how attorneys and
judges should work to lessen the death-denial influences in capital cases
because these existential influences contribute to the arbitrariness of the
application of the death penalty. That section also proposes some ideas for
24. A search of the term "terror management" in the Westlaw "Law Reviews and Journals"
database on April 30, 2008 resulted in 40 documents, and all but five of those documents were pub-
lished in the last eight years. The discussion of terror management theory in a number of these ar-
ticles is often brief or limited to footnotes. See, e.g., Symposium. System Justification Theory and
Research Implications for Law, Legal Advocacy, and Social Justice, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1119, 1138
n.70, 1140 n.78 (2006); Adam J. Hirsch, Evolutionary Theories of Common Law Efficiency: Reasons
for (Cognitive) Skepticism, 32 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 425, 431 n.32 (2005); Christina E. Wells, Fear
and Loathing in Constitutional Decision-Making, 2005 Wis. L. REV. 115, 166-72 (2005) ; R.A. Len-
hardt, Understanding the Mark: Race, Stigma, and Equality in Context, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 803, 835-
36 (2004); Donald C. Langevoort, Ego, Human Behavior, and Law, 81 VA. L. REV. 853, 872 n.56
(1995).
A search of the Westlaw "Law Reviews and Journals" database on April 30, 2008 for "Ernest
/2 Becker" resulted in 62 documents, many of which only briefly quote or cite him. See, e.g., Ri-
chard Delgado, Derrick Bell and the Ideology of Racial Reform: Will We Ever Be Saved? And We Are
Not Saved: The Elusive Quest for Racial Justice, 97 YALE L.J. 923, 946 n. 138 (1988) (book review).
Becker's influence has appeared in other areas. For example, Don DeLillo's novel White Noise was
influenced by Denial of Death. See generally DON DELILLO, WHITE NOISE (1985); Cornel Bonca,
Don DeLillo's White Noise: The Natural Language of the Species, in COLLEGE LITERATURE 23:2
(1996), available at http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/miqa3709/is_199606/ai n8753398.
Becker's book has at least made one prominent appearance in a movie, when Aivy made a gift of the
book to Annie in Woody Allen's Annie Hall. ANNIE HALL (United Artists 1977).
25. Some other legal areas where Becker's theories may apply include cases involving civil re-
sponsibilities for death, non-capital homicide cases, questions of how to deal with surviving children
and possessions of the dead, assisted suicide, and termination of life support.
20081
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further experiments that would be helpful to understanding the terror man-
agement effects in a legal setting. The conclusion appeals for more educa-
tion in the legal community and for further interdisciplinary study in the
scientific community.
II. EXISTENTIAL THEORIES ABOUT THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LIFE
AND CONSCIOUSNESS OF DEATH26
The cultural anthropologist Ernest Becker addressed questions about
human behavior in several books, including The Denial of Death,27 which
won the Pulitzer Prize.28 Becker believed in seeking an interdisciplinary
understanding of human beings, and his analysis built upon the works of
S6ren Kierkegaard, Martin Heidegger, Sigmund Freud, Otto Rank, Karen
Homey, Paul Tillich and others. 29 His work followed in the footsteps of
these and others who sought a deeper understanding of human motiva-
tions.
Becker built upon ideas from evolution and existential philosophy,
both areas that relatively recently have spawned branches of psychiatry
named after them. Becker and the evolutionary psychologists use the
foundations developed by Charles Darwin, who revealed how human be-
30ings and their motivations have evolved throughout history.
Becker's work also has a close relationship with the existentialist phi-
losophers who explained how humans seek to give meaning to their lives
and define themselves by their choices in life. 31 Although there is no one
26. This section provides an overview of some of Ernest Becker's work and of some of the theo-
ries underlying terror management theory. It is meant to provide a foundation for the legal analysis of
this Article and is not meant to be an exhaustive discussion of existential philosophy or psychology.
27. See generally BECKER, THE DENIAL OF DEATH (1973). The Denial of Death built upon Beck-
er's previous works, including Birth and Death of Meaning and Angel in Armor. See generally
ERNEST BECKER, THE BIRTH AND DEATH OF MEANING (1962); ERNEST BECKER, ANGEL IN ARMOR
(1975); and ERNEST BECKER, ESCAPE FROM EVIL (1975).
28. Ernest Becker died from cancer at the age of 49, two months prior to the awarding of the
Pulitzer Prize in 1974. See About the Ernest Becker Foundation: Ernest Becker,
http://faculty.washington.edu/nelgee/aboutebf/default.htm (last visited Jan. 9, 2007).
29. The various writers are not discussed in-depth here, but see Ernest Becker's writings for
further discussion of some of these writers. For example, he discussed how "Kierkegaard's whole
understanding of man's character is that it is a structure built up to avoid perception of the 'terror,
perdition [and] annihilation [that] dwell next door to every man.'" (brackets in original) BECKER, THE
DENIAL OF DEATH, supra note 27, at 70 (quoting SOREN KIERKEGAARD, THE SICKNESS UNTO DEATH
(1849)). See generally KAREN HORNEY, NEUROSIS AND HUMAN GROWTH (1950) and PAUL TILLICH,
THE COURAGE TO BE (1950).
30. See generally, e.g., ROBERT WRIGHT, THE MORAL ANIMAL: WHY WE ARE THE WAY WE
ARE: THE NEW SCIENCE OF EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY (1994).
31. See, e.g., S.E. FROST, JR., BASIC TEACHINGS OF THE GREAT PHILOSOPHERS 266 (1962)
(noting existentialism's "concern with reconciling man with the necessity of death"). Although not all
philosophers who are labeled existentialists agree, Jean-Paul Sartre explained that "existence precedes
essence," meaning that "man exists, turns up, appears on the scene, and only afterwards, defines
himself." JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, EXISTENTIALISM, reprinted in BASIC WRITINGS OF EXISTENTIALISM
345 (Gordon Marino ed. 2004).
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definition of existential philosophy, the existential crisis each human faces
is the search for meaning in life and the realization that each individual is
responsible for giving meaning to her or his life. Existential psychologists
work to help people take control of their life choices. 32
Becker elaborated on this existential dilemma and the quest for mean-
ing that results from the human realization that one is housed in a decaying
body that one day will die. Becker and others have recognized that this
terrible realization - that you and everyone you know will die -- must im-
pact the lives of humans, who also have evolved to have "a biological
proclivity for self-preservation. "33
A. The Terror of Being Human
In Denial of Death, Becker argued that a primary motivation for hu-
man actions is the "all-encompassing fear of death," which drives one "to
attempt to transcend death through culturally standardized hero systems
and symbols. "34  The foundation for his theories is that humans have a
special self-consciousness that puts us above other creatures while at the
same time we are mortal like all other life: We have "an awareness of
[our] own splendid uniqueness" because we protrude "out of nature with a
towering majesty," but we return "into the ground a few feet in order
blindly and dumbly to rot and disappear forever. ,35 While other animals
live and disappear with thoughtlessness, humans "live a whole lifetime
with the fate of death haunting one's dreams and even the most sun-filled
days. " 3 6
The human anxiety that Becker addressed is not just about death alone.
The terror of being human occurs also because of the conflicting realiza-
32. See, e.g., EXISTENTIAL PSYCHOLOGY (Roy May et al. eds.., 2nd ed. 1996). "[The sixties
saw the emergence of an existential school of psychology. The works of Rollo May, Viktor Franld,
and Ludwig Binswanger are the most representative of this movement, which focuses on helping the
individual to own his or her own choices." Gordon Marino, Introduction, in BASIC WRITINGS OF
EXISTENTIALISM xv (Gordon Marino ed. 2004).
33. Joel .D. Lieberman et al., Vicarious Annihilation: The Effect of Mortality Salience on Percep-
tions of Hate Crimes, 25 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 547, 549 (2001).
34. BECKER, ESCAPE FROM EVIL, supra note 27, at xvii.
35. BECKER, THE DENIAL OF DEATH, supra note 27, at 26. Some scholars note that as the intel-
ligence and self-consciousness evolved in human beings to provide adaptive advantages in a societal
lifestyle, human awareness of mortality developed as a by-product. Solomon et al, supra note 19, at
6. Subsequently, humans who adopted cultural worldviews that helped them cope with the anxiety of
death developed an evolutionary advantage. Id. at 18-19. "Archeological evidence, theory and re-
search from evolutionary psychology, anthropology, and cognitive neuroscience converge in support
of the assertion that humans 'solved' the problems associated with the realization of their mortality by
the creation of uniquely human cultural affectations, including art, language, religion, agriculture, and
economics." Id. at 19.
36. BECKER, THE DENIAL OF DEATH, supra note 27, at 27. Becker also addresses how children
must struggle as they develop this awareness of the high expectations that they be above the animals
while also dealing with their animal bodily functions. See id. at 28-46.
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tion that although as humans we are special and intelligent, our finite lives
consist of grotesque bodily functions.37 We face "the human paradox" of
being a creature that is an animal who also knows its animal limitations.38
As a human, one must face the ambiguity and powerlessness "to be
straightforwardly an animal or an angel. " 39
This "condition of individuality within finitude"4" creates anxiety and
several problems for humans.4' As Becker explained in discussing Kier-
kegaard: "This is the terror: to have emerged from nothing, to have a
name, consciousness of self, deep inner feelings, an excruciating inner
yearning for life and self-expression - and with all this yet to die." 42 Like
J. Alfred Prufrock in T.S. Eliot's poem, we cannot escape our awareness
and become "a pair of ragged claws." 43 These realizations and their ac-
companying terror contribute to the many psychological problems that face
human beings, such as depression, fetishism, and schizophrenia. 44
To survive with this terror, humans push the overwhelming terror of
death to the subconscious. 45  Then we deal with the subconscious know-
ledge of our mortality by seeking immortality in various ways, some
healthy and some not healthy. The terror of life overwhelms humans, so
all humans seek some type of illusion to survive. 6 "The prison of one's
character is painstakingly built to deny one thing and one thing alone:
one's creatureliness. ,47
To deal with the knowledge of mortality, humans search for meaning
in their lives, for self-esteem, and for the illusion of immortality. Mortal
humans create cultural symbols that do not age or decay that allow them to
attach themselves to immortal symbols, thus, providing a protection
against death.48 They strive toward heroism and create immortal works of
art. The subconscious fear of death drives humans to build buildings,
37. Id. at 87. "Man is literally split in two: he has an awareness of his own splendid uniqueness
in that he sticks out of nature with a towering majesty, and yet he goes back into the ground a few feet
in order blindly and dumbly to rot and disappear forever." Id. at 26.
38. Id. at 87. Becker quoted Kierkegaard as stating that humans are a "synthesis of the soulish
and bodily." Id. at 69
39. Id. at 69.
40. BECKER, THE DENIAL OF DEATH, supra note 27, at 26 (emphasis in original).
41. Id. at 49-58. Thus, a problem is that humans are "gods with anuses." Id. at 51.
42. Id. at 87.
43. "I should have been a pair of ragged claws/ Scuttling across the floors of silent seas." T.S.
Eliot, The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock, in THE HARPER ANTHOLOGY OF POETRY 558
(John Frederick Nims ed., 1981).
44. See, e.g., BECKER, THE DENIAL OF DEATH, supra note 27, at 208-52.
45. See IRVIN D. YALOM, LOVE'S EXECUTIONERS 6 (2000). "We know about death, intellectual-
ly we know the facts, but we-that is, the unconscious portion of the mind that protects us from over-
whelming anxiety-have split off, or dissociated, the terror associated with death." Id. at 5-6 (empha-
sis in original).
46. BECKER, THE DENIAL OF DEATH, supra note 27, at 202.
47. Id. at 87.
48. BECKER, ESCAPE FROM EVIL, supra note 27, at 3. Becker explained that what people really
fear "is not so much extinction, but extinction with insignificance." Id. at 4 (emphasis in original).
[Vol. 32
2008] Existential Death Penalty
write books, work for corporations, follow political and religious leaders,
join organizations, accumulate money, buy large houses, attach to sports
teams, write law review articles, etc. 49 Humans may also drink and drug
themselves to relieve their existential angst, or they shop.5 °
At the end of Denial of Death, Becker offered advice to our species:
Whatever humans do "on this planet has to be done in the lived truth of
the terror of creation, of the grotesque, of the rumble of panic underneath
everything. Otherwise it is false." "' Thus, knowledge is the key. Each
individual must consciously seek healthy repressions or illusions in finding
some type of "cosmic heroism" that is beneficial and not destructive. 52
Although Becker gave special context to his solution, similar advice
has been dispensed through the ages. Existential philosophers concluded
that "[t]he most powerful inducement for us to adopt a personally valid,
self-directed life is the acknowledgment of our personal death."53  To go
back more than two thousand years, Pindar advised: "Desire not thou,
dear my soul, a life immortal, but use the tools that are to thine hand." 54
To put it in more modern terms, in a recent popular country music song, a
dying friend counseled the singer, "Some day I hope you get the chance/
To live like you were dying. 55
49. Id. The connection between the accumulation of money and the seeking of immortality was
recognized more than 3000 years ago in the Upanishads. See The Brihadaranyaka Upanishad 4.2, in
THE UPANISHADS 35 (Eknath Easwaran trans. 1992) (stating "My lord, if I could get all the wealth in
the world, would it help me to go beyond death?").
50. BECKER, THE DENIAL OF DEATH, supra note 27, at 284. See also Albert C. Lin, Virtual
consumption: A Second Life for Earth?, 2008 B.Y.U. L. REV. 47 (stating "[b]luntly put, 'possession
and consumption are thinly veiled efforts to assert that one is special and therefore more than just an
animal fated to die and decay"). (quoting Sheldon Solomon et al., Lethal Consumption: Death-Denying
Materialism, in PSYCHOLOGY AND CONSUMER CULTURE: THE STRUGGLE FOR A GOOD LIFE IN A
MATERIALISTIC WORLD 134 (Tim Kasser & Allen D. Kanner eds, 2004). All humans have to deal
with the reality of the fact they are mortal animals, but not all ways of dealing with the reality are
harmful. In addition to some of the coping mechanisms discussed here, the fear of death may play a
role in mental illness. "Concerns about mortality play a significant role in the etiology of a variety of
forms of psychopathology, including schizophrenia, neuroticism, depression, obsessive-compulsive
disorder (OCD), and posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD)." IN THE WAKE OF 9/11: THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF TERROR 192 (2003) [hereinafter "IN THE WAKE OF 9/11"].
51. BECKER, THE DENIAL OF DEATH, supra note 27, at 283-84. "Whatever is achieved must be
achieved from within the subjective energies of creatures, without deadening, with the full exercise of
passion, of vision, of pain, of fear, and of sorrow." Id. at 284.
52. Id. at 284-85.
53. Leonard L. Martin et al., The Roar of Awakening: Mortality Acknowledgment as a Call to
Authentic Living, in HANDBOOK OF EEP, supra note 19, at 435. "This acknowledgment provides us
with both the insight and the urgency we need to define our essence through active choices based on
passionately chosen personal values rather than inappropriately internalized cultural values." Id.
54. Pindar, The Extant Odes 81 (2006).
55. TIM MCGRAw, LIVE LIKE YOU WERE DYING (Warner Bros. Publications 2006).
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B. Scapegoating and Attempts to Destroy Evil
Becker expanded upon the theories from Denial of Death in Escape
from Evil, which was published after his death.56 This last book of his
clarifies the impacts of the subconscious fear of death upon our society,
and it provides a foundation for some of the current research about vi-
olence and hatred in society.
In Escape from Evil, Becker explained that when human beings sub-
consciously attach themselves to immortality symbols to address their fear
of death, "a new kind of instability and anxiety are created. 57 Each so-
ciety creates its own culture as an immortality device for its members.58
So, in order to survive and live in the face of certain death, humans must
convince themselves that they will create or belong to something that is
immortal. 59 These defenses against the terror of the world and our fear of
death have been called "our heroic projects" in our attempt to destroy
evil. 60
In human beings' subconscious quest for immortality to overcome the
terror of death, however, they must oppose belief systems that threaten
their own immortality belief systems.61 If my belief system protects me
from the dread of death, your belief system threatens my protection. In
response, to save my protection, I must destroy yours.6a As explained by
Ivan Kamamazov in The Brothers Karamazov, people demand others to
"[plut away your gods and come and worship ours, or we will kill you and
your gods!" 63  This quest for immortality and opposition to those who
threaten our immortality illusions, result in "scapegoating" of others and
56. BECKER, ESCAPE FROM EVIL, supra note 27, at xv.
57. Id. at 5.
58. Id. at 124-25. "[C]ultures are fundamentally and basically styles of heroic death denial." Id.
at 125 (emphasis in original).
59. See SAM KEEN, THE FUTURE OF EVIL 6 (2006). Keen explains:
Our desire to merge with a larger whole, to dedicate our lives to a higher cause, to
serve cosmic powers makes it easy for ambitious leaders to use. Some Adolf Eich-
mann, Lt. Calley, Hum tribesman, or Serbian nationalist who wants desperately to do
his duty and belong, can always be found to carry out the bloodier aspects that are ne-
cessary for a 'final solution' to the problems of evil.
Id. at 7.
60. Id. at 4. But "[o]ur heroic projects aimed at destroying evil have the paradoxical effect of
bringing more evil into the world." Id.
61. BECKER, ESCAPE FROM EVIL, supra note 27, at 108-14.
62. This reasoning helps explain Western culture's myth of redemptive violence, i.e., the idea
presented in popular culture and movies that violence saves us and corrects the ills of the world. See
generally, WINK, supra note 12, at 50.
63. FYODOR DOSTOEVSKY, THE BROTHERS KARAMAZOV 282 (Constance Garnett trans. 1996).
Ivan explains, "This craving for community of worship is the chief misery of every man individually
and of all humanity from the beginning of time. For the sake of common worship they've slain each
other with the sword." Id. (emphasis in original).
[Vol. 32
2008] Existential Death Penalty 65
much of the evil in the world. 64 As scholar Sam Keen summarized, "The
root of humanly caused evil is not our animal nature, not territorial ag-
gression, not even innate selfishness, but is the need to gain self esteem, to
deny mortality, and achieve a heroic self image. ,65
Becker explained that various types of killing result from the subcons-
cious fear of death: killing allows us the illusion of controlling what we
fear. The Roman arena games showed "the ultimate personal control of
death. ,66  Similarly, one reason that war exists is because a nation must
represent victory and immortality for its citizens.67 Humans are able to
deal with the subconscious fear of their rotting bodies and death by believ-
ing they are attached to their immortal and pure country.68 By going to
war, they control death. 69  Thus, evil results by seeking to triumph over
evil. A human "is a frightened animal who tries to triumph, an animal
who will not admit his own insignificance, that he cannot perpetuate him-
self and his group forever, that no one is invulnerable no matter how much
of the blood of others is spilled to try to demonstrate it. ,70
One of Becker's influences was psychologist Otto Rank, who was one
of the first "to incorporate existentialist concepts into a broad theoretical
conception of human behavior" and to theorize about the role of fears of
life and death. 71 Recent writers who have explored these theories include
Erich Fromm, Robert Jay Lifton, and Irvin Yalom.72 Today, experimental
psychologists who have been inspired by Becker's works are performing
experiments to prove his theories. As discussed in the next section, these
64. BECKER, ESCAPE FROM EVIL, supra note 27, at 108-14.
65. KEEN, supra note 59, at 6 (2006). "High self-esteem ... reduces the fear of death by allow-
ing individuals to see themselves as part of something enduring." Donald C. Langevoort, Taking
Myths Seriously: An Essay for Lawyers, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1569, 1575 (2000).
66. BECKER, ESCAPE FROM EVIL, supra note 27, at 110.
67. Id. at 117. For example, in William Shakespeare's Henry V, to rally his troops to battle,
King Henry tells them that they will achieve immortality: "And Crispin Crispian shall ne'er go by,/
From this day to the ending of the world,/ But we in it shall be remembered -- We few, we happy
few, we band of brothers." WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE LIFE OF HENRY THE FIFTH act
IV, sc. 3 (1918).
68. BECKER, ESCAPE FROM EVIL, supra note 27, at 115.
69. "[E]vil rests on the passionate person motive to perpetuate oneself, and for each individual
this is literally a life-and-death matter for which any sacrifice is not too great, provided it is the sacri-
fice of someone else and provided that the leader and the group approve of it." Id. at 122.
70. Id. at 151.
71. Tom Pyszczynski et al., Experimental Existential Psychology, in HANDBOOK OF EEP, supra
note 19, at 6. See BECKER, THE DENIAL OF DEATH, supra note 27, at 152 (stating that "[tlhe strength
of Rank's work, which enabled him to draw such an unfailing psychological portrait of man in the
round, was that he connected psychoanalytic clinical insight with the basic ontological motives of the
human creature").
72. Pyszczynski, supra note 71, at 6. Dr. Yalom has identified "four basic concerns that he
believes exert enormous influence on all people's lives: death, freedom, existential isolation, and
meaninglessness." Id. See also generally IRVIN YALOM, LOVE'S EXECUTIONERS & OTHER TALES OF
PSYCHOTHERAPY (2000).
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experiments also have begun to explore the relevance of these theories for
the legal system.
III. RECENT TERROR MANAGEMENT THEORY EXPERIMENTS APPLICABLE
TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM
More than 300 studies in the area of experimental existential psychol-
ogy have shown that Ernest Becker's theories apply in the real world.73
Some psychologists have built on Becker's writings with research to sup-
port what they call "Terror Management Theory" ["TMT"]. 4  This
theory claims that the combination of the animal biological predisposition
toward self-preservation with "the uniquely human awareness of the inevi-
tability of death gives rise to potentially overwhelming terror. , 75
As explained in the previous section, to address this terror, humans
construct "beliefs about the nature of reality that infuse individuals with a
sense that they are persons of value in a world of meaning, different from
and superior to corporeal and mortal nature. , 76 Because our world views
and cultures protect us from our fear of death, those with different world
views and cultures threaten those protective devices. Thus, people re-
spond to those with different views by conversion of the outsiders, deroga-
tion of the outsiders, assimilation of the outsiders, accommodation of the
outsiders, or annihilation of the outsiders.77
Many of the studies use similar techniques. The psychologists provide
one group of subjects with subtle reminders of death - or mortality sa-
lience - and then note the differences in behavior between that group and a
control group.78 This technique of "priming" subjects by giving them an
exercise or survey that plants subconscious ideas that affect behavior is
73. See Terror Management Theory: The Theory, http://www.tmt.missouri.edu/index.html. See
also Solomon et al., supra note 19, at 22; Jamie Arndt et al., Understanding the Cognitive Architec-
ture of Psychological Defense Against the Awareness of Death [hereinafter Understanding the Cogni-
tive], in HANDBOOK OF EEP, supra note 19, at 36. A full understanding of the psychology of Terror
Management Theory is beyond the scope of this Article. The goal of this Article is to raise awareness
about the effects of death reminders in capital cases, to discuss some strategies, and to encourage
further research with collaboration between members of the bar and the mental health profession.
74. The name "Terror Management Theory" is a somewhat misleading name because the theory
for the most part is about the anxiety of individuals and not about international terrorism. Adding to
the confusion is the fact that a leading book on Terror Management Theory does feature a large dis-
cussion of connections between TMT and the terrorist attacks of 9/11. See IN THE WAKE OF 9/11,
supra note 50, at 27.
75. Id. at 27. Studies have shown that reminders of other unpleasant experiences besides death,
such as pain, do not have the effects that reminders of death do. See Mark J. Landau et al., On the
Compatibility of Terror Management Theory and Perspectives on Human Evolution, 5 EVOLUTIONARY
PSYCHOL. 476, 505 (2007).
76. IN THE WAKE OF 9/11, supra note 50, at 27.
77. Id. at 29-34.
78. The greatest effects occur when the reminders of death are subtle and when the reminders are
no longer in a person's active memory. See IN THE WAKE OF 9/11, supra note 50, at 56, 58.
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often used by experimental psychologists.79 For example, one study of
190 participants revealed that after mortality salience, people showed in-
creased preference for a charismatic political candidate. 80  A similar study
concluded that post 9/11 reminders of death may have affected the 2004
U.S. presidential election.8' One study found that U.S. participants who
were reminded of death were more likely to blame a Japanese car manu-
facturer for an auto accident than those who were not reminded of death.8 2
Another study found that mortality salience reduces commitment among
romantic partners when the partners have different worldviews.83
Terror management theory "proposes that the uniquely human aware-
ness of mortality is a ubiquitous concern that plays an important role in
virtually all forms of human behavior and underlies the development and
maintenance of culture and self-esteem as the primary means by which the
fear of death is ameliorated." 84 The confrontation with death is not neces-
sarily conscious for many people, and studies show that subconscious
death concerns may be activated by such seemingly unrelated topics as
awareness of one's own bodies, encounters with nature, abandonment by
intimates, or an inability to identify with one's own social group.85
The studies have found that a person's behavior is affected by mortali-
ty salience where (1) the reminders of death are subtle; 86 (2) the reminders
make one think of one's own death; and (3) there is enough time so that
79. See, e.g., MALCOLM GLADWELL, BLINK 52-61 (2005). For an example of where the tech-
nique is used to prime an idea besides mortality, one study found that requiring subjects to compose
sentences with words about politeness or rudeness affected the patience of the subjects. Id. at 53-55.
80. Florette Cohen et al., Fatal Attraction: The Effects of Mortality Salience on Evaluations of
Charismatic, Task-Oriented, and Relationship-Oriented Leaders, 15 PSYCHOL. Sci. 846, 846 (2004).
81. See Florette Cohen et al., American Roulette: The Effects of Reminders of Death on Support
for George W. Bush in the 2004 Presidential Election, 5 ANALYSES OF SOC. ISSUES & PUB. POL'Y
177, 177 (2005). See also Sharon Begley, When Terror Strikes, Liberals and the Right Vote Further
Apart, WALL STREET J. ONLINE, available at
http://online.wsj.com/public/article/SB116068988757591182-
3ET5PyJildgW7pI62fUVFsBf4_w_20071013.html?mod=blogsshorter (last visited on Oct. 13, 2006).
Unfortunately, some of the studies about the effects of TMT on the 2004 election might have a side
effect of politicizing the science behind the TMT studies for some.
82. Neal R. Feigenson, Emotions, Risk Perceptions and Blaming in 9/11 Cases, 68 BROOK. L.
REV. 959, 973 (2003) (citing Lori J. Nelson et al.., General and Personal Mortality Salience and
Nationalistic Bias, 23 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 884 (1997)).
83. See Amy Strachman & Jeff Schimel, Terror Management and Close Relationships: Evidence
That Mortality Salience Reduces Commitment Among Partners with Different Wordviews, 23 J. Soc.
& PERS. RELATIONSHIPS 965, 971-72 (2006).
84. Solomon et al., supra note 19, at 28.
85. Sander L. Koole et al., The Best of Two Worlds: Experimental Existential Psychology Now
and in the Future, in HANDBOOK OF EEP, supra note 19, at 498.
86. Because the Terror Management Theory effects occur in response to how humans deal with
subconscious fears of death and not conscious fears of death, subtle mortality salience has greater
effects than stronger reminders of death. See IN THE WAKE OF 9/11, supra note 50, at 56.
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the reminders are pushed to the person's subconscious.87 If the person is
consciously thinking about her or his own death, the mortality salience
does not have a significant effect.88
Studies have used different settings to find significant effects of mor-
tality salience. In one study, participants were put in a room and asked to
sift sand out of black dye, and the only way to do so was to sift the sand
by pouring the black dye through a cloth. 89 For some participants, the
cloth in the room was a white cloth, and for others, it was a small Ameri-
can flag. 90 Terror management theory predicts that after mortality sa-
lience, individuals would be less willing to degrade a cherished cultural
symbol like the American flag. 91 The results were consistent with that
theory as participants who had been reminded of death and put in the
American flag room took longer to complete the task than those who had
not been reminded of death, while there was no similar difference in the
room with the white cloth.92 A similar study, which asked participants to
hang a crucifix when the only device to pound a nail into the wall was the
crucifix, had similar findings.93
Other studies have used legal settings and found that mortality salience
makes participants more punitive. 94 Twenty-two municipal court judges in
Tucson, Arizona participated in one study. 95 The judges believed the pur-
pose of the study was to examine the relationship between personality
87. "The findings of these studies . . . suggest that worldview defense occurs after death has been
made salient but only when concerns about mortality are no longer in active memory when dependent
measures are assessed." Id. at 58.
88. "The fact that both increased defense of the worldview and increased accessibility of death-
related thoughts emerge after a delay and distraction suggests that terror management effects emerge
when the problem of death is high in accessibility but nonetheless outside current focal conscious-
ness." Id. at 59.
89. Id. at 51.
90. Id. at 51-52.
91. IN THE WAKE OF 9/11, supra note 50, at 52.
92. Id. Another study found that reminders of death made individuals more likely to contribute to
a charity supporting an American cause but no effect on the amount of money given to a foreign
cause. See Eva Jonas et al., The Scrooge Effect: Evidence that Mortality Salience Increases Prosocial
Attitudes and Behavior, 28 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1342, 1351 (2002) (concluding that"supporting one's own culture's own causes might serve a protective function against the human fear
of death and annihilation").
93. IN THE WAKE OF 9/11, supra note 50, at 51-52. "[Flollowing mortality salience and needing
to inappropriately use the crucifix and American flag to solve the problems, the students took twice as
long to complete the problems and reported substantially more negative feelings about undertaking
them [compared to students who were asked to think about television instead of death]." Id. at 52.
94. "There is ... a growing body of research conducted in a variety of independent laboratories
demonstrating that intimations of mortality increase punitive judgments toward lawbreakers." Jamie
Arndt et al., Terror Management in the Courtroom: Exploring the Effects of Mortality Salience on
Legal Decision-Making. 11 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 407, 422 (2005). Professors Arndt, Cook,
Lieberman and Solomon list twenty-two terror management studies done with legally relevant out-
comes. See id. at 414-19. See also Lieberman, supra note 33, at 547.
95. IN THE WAKE OF 9/11, supra note 50, at 45.
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traits and decisions in setting bond, but the real purpose of the study was
to evaluate the impact of death reminders on the judges.96 The judges
completed questionnaires on personality, but half of the judges also were
given questions about death, i.e., a mortality salience treatment, while the
control group was not given such questions.97
After completing the questionnaires, the judges were given hypotheti-
cal legal case briefs describing information about a defendant charged with
prostitution.98 The brief included basic arrest information and notes from
a prosecutor indicating the defendant had no established community ties
and that the prosecutor was opposing releasing the defendant on her own
recognizance. 99
The study found that the reminders of death created judges who were
more punitive than judges who were not reminded of death. In the study,
judges in the mortality salience group set an average bond of $455.100
Judges from the control group set an average bond of $50.10' The psy-
chologists conducting the study concluded that "this result suggests that if
one of these municipal court judges, in the course of his or her daily life,
happened to have been reminded of his or her own death shortly before
setting bond for a person accused of a crime, there is a good chance the
unfortunate woman would have been required to come up with substantial
bond-or await trial in jail."10 2 Further, "[t]his result provided provoca-
tive initial support for the proposition that mortality salience engenders a
greater need for cultural worldviews and consequently provokes more vi-
gorous reactions to moral transgressors." 10 3
The study was repeated with some variation using undergraduate col-
lege students to set bond options for a defendant accused of prostitution. 104
As in the experiment with the Tucson judges, "students asked to think
about death set higher bonds for the alleged prostitute than those in the
control group, but only if they had negative views of prostitution from the
96. Id.
97. Id. at 46. In the mortality salience group, judges were asked to write a short response to
three questions: "'Please briefly describe the emotions that the thought of your own death arouses in
you' and 'Jot down, as specifically as you can, what you think will happen to you as you physically
die and once you are physically dead.'" Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. IN THE WAKE OF 9/11, supra note 50, at 46.
101. Id.
102. Id. Other studies where subjects were asked to think of other unpleasant circumstances be-
sides one's death - such as failures, speaking in public, social exclusion, paralysis and considering the
death of someone else - did not yield the same results as the studies involving mortality salience. Id.
at 49.
103. Id. at 47. Another scholar has speculated that the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks may
have some similar effects onjurors. See Neal Feigenson, supra note 82, at 972-78.
104. IN THE WAKE OF 9/11, supra note 50, at 47.
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outset. ' 10 5  The result that the effect was obtained only in the situation
where students found prostitution morally repugnant is consistent with
Becker's theories. Thoughts of mortality make one protect one's
worldview against those with different morals and different worldviews.' 06
The studies also have found that not everyone has the same level of
hostility toward other worldviews and culture following mortality salience.
The effects of mortality salience are reduced in subjects who have high
self-esteem, worldviews that valued tolerance, secure attachments to oth-
ers, or strong beliefs in symbolic immortality (such as through children,
creative activities, or spiritual attainments).10 7 These factors help lessen
the subconscious fear of death, so that there is less hostility toward other
worldviews following reminders of death. 108
Although mortality salience increases hostility toward groups who are
different, studies show that the impact of mortality salience is not all nega-
tive. Mortality salience also "increases positive responses to those who
validate a person's beliefs." 10 9 The result, however, may be that jurors
will find that a prosecutor who represents the state validates their own
beliefs, making the jurors even more biased toward the prosecution and
more punitive against a defendant. "0
A more overall positive effect of mortality salience is that it may boost
a person's concerns about procedural fairness in some situations. "Several
studies have examined the relationship between procedural fairness and
[mortality salience] and have found that fair process concerns are greater
after individuals contemplate their own deaths." "'
For example, one experiment focused on the ability of jurors to obey a
judge's instruction regarding the inadmissibility of evidence.112 The study,
which involved presenting participants with a transcript of a robbery trial,
found that that participants who scored highly on a justice nullification
measure were more punitive when told that certain evidence was ruled
105. Id.
106. See id. TMT experts have also postulated that death reminders might prompt jurors to stick
to preliminary decisions about the guilt of an accused and to ignore conflicting information. Eva Jonas
et al., Connecting Terror Management and Dissonance Theory: Evidence That Mortality Salience
Increases the Preference for Supporting Information After Decisions, 29 PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. BULL. 1181, 1188 (2003). "The finding that mock jurors made more guilty decisions when
photographs of an actual murder victim were used is consistent with this possibility." Id. (citation
omitted).
107. IN THE WAKE OF 9/11, supra note 50, at 85-86.
108. See Landau et al., supra note 75, at 480-81.
109. Arndt et al., Terror Management in the Courtroom, supra note 94, at 422.
110. One study has "found that closing arguments in a simulated trial that remind participants of
their mortality can increase punitive judgments in robbery, assault, and murder cases." Alison Cook
et al., Firing Back at the Backfire Effect: The Influence of Mortality Salience and Nullification Beliefs
on Reactions to Inadmissible Evidence, 28 LAw & HUM. BEHAV., 389, 407 (2004).
111. Arndt et al., Terror Management in the Courtroom, supra note 94, at 424-25.
112. Id. at 426-27.
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inadmissible than when it was ruled admissible. 1 3 But participants in the
same category regarding justice nullification, when reminded of death,
were "less punitive in the inadmissible condition compared with the ad-
missible and control conditions." 114  Experts have concluded that "[t]his
finding supports the hypothesis that [mortality salience] leads people to
defend a worldview that often includes upholding the law and an increased
desire for fairness when they rely on their own sense of justice."" 5 In
other words, some people, when reminded of death, cling tighter to the
immortality device of the law and the instructions from the judge. 116
There are some criticisms of terror management theory. For example,
in every situation there are a number of motivations driving an individual,
and one might argue that the terror management theorists over-emphasize
the role of mortality reminders. 1 7 At least one critic has complained that
the people conducting some of the experiments use student volunteers as
subjects and then extrapolate the results to cover diverse cultures. 1 8 Oth-
ers have argued that TMT is inconsistent with evolutionary biology and
that the effects are less than the TMT advocates claim. " 9 The terror man-
agement theorists have responded to these critiques, and they continue to
do further studies to explore and test their theories. 20  Thus far, the evi-
dence supports the idea that death reminders may have a large impact on
behavior.
113. Id. at 426-27.
114. Id. at 427. On the other hand, "[jiurors whose personal beliefs involved a strict adherence to
the law did not exhibit a backfire effect regardless of [mortality salience]." Id.
115. Id.
116. The finding from this study is arguably inconsistent with the result in the study of the Arizona
judges and other studies finding jurors are more punitive after mortality salience. "On the one hand,
mortality salience evokes the motivation to be more punitive toward someone who violates the
worldview by breaking the law. On the other hand, there is also the motivation to uphold the law by
following a judicial ruling." Alison Cook et al., supra note 110, at 407 (concluding that at least in
one study "the motivation to follow legal guidelines appeared to be the stronger of the two").
117. Even experts in the area of TMT acknowledge that the subconscious fear of death cannot
explain all human motivation. Drs. Tom Pyszczynski, Sheldon Solomon, and Jeff Greenburg have
noted that "[l]ife is complex, and surely a variety of factors contributes to these phenomena." Id. at
86. Still, they argue that based on their studies, "TMT should be an essential component of any
sincere effort to understand human hatred and violence." Id.
118. Lynn E. DeLisi, Book Forum: In the Wake of 9/11: The Psychology of Terror, 160 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 1019 (2003) (book review). In response, TMT experts note "that terror management
findings have been obtained in a variety of countries, with a variety of participant populations ....
and with a variety of ecologically valid techniques of activating thoughts of death... and measuring
their effects." Arndt et al., Terror Management in the Courtroom, supra note 94, at 433. Another
study found no terror management effects on bankruptcy judges, but the authors of the study specu-
lated that it was possible they "did not make their mortality salient enough." Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et
al., Inside the Bankruptcy Judge's Mind, 86 B.U. L. REv. 1227, 1256 (2006).
119. See, e.g., Carlos David Navarrete & Daniel M.T. Fessler, Normative Bias and Adaptive
Challenges: A Relational Approach to Coalitional Psychology and a Critique of Terror Management
Theory, 3 J. EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOL. 297, 297 (2005).
120. For example, advocates of Terror Management Theory have written a detailed response to
Navarete and Fessler's critique, and they argue that TMT is consistent with evolutionary theory. See
Landau et al., supra note 75, at 476.
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Although the studies have included some experiments in the legal area,
there needs to be more work done in the area of cases that by their nature
involve reminders of death, such as wrongful death actions and death pe-
nalty cases. One law review author has noted a connection between the
death penalty and terror management theory. 121  In his article, he ad-
dressed how the terror management influence contributed to making the
death penalty arbitrary. This Article, however, seeks not only to consider
some of the problems that arise in the death penalty system because of
terror management, but also how attorneys, judges and legal scholars may
use an understanding of TMT to try to lessen its influence and to achieve
fairer results in capital cases.
IV. CAPITAL PUNISHMENT CASES AND MORTALITY SALIENCE
In order to sentence someone who has been convicted of murder to
death, a jury must make certain findings. Generally, once a defendant is
convicted, the jurors consider a range of aggravating factors that often
focus on the murder and qualities of the defendant.122 For example, de-
pending on the jurisdiction and the case, jurors might consider facts about
the murder such as whether or not the murder was cruel, whether or not
other people were killed or put in danger, and the type of weapon used to
kill the victim. 123
The jurors might also consider information about the victim, such as
the age of the victim, the victim's job, whether the victim had family, and
the impact of the victim's death on her or his family. 24 In Payne v. Ten-
nessee,1 25 the Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment is not vi-
olated when the prosecution presents evidence about the victim's personal
characteristics and the impact of the murder on the victim's family. 126 For
example, a state may allow a witness to testify about the impact of the
murder on the victim's three-year-old child, and the prosecutor may com-
121. Judges, supra note 23, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 155.
122. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (upholding modem death penalty system);
Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980) (discussing aggravating factors). For a list of aggravating
factors listed in statutes throughout the United States, see Kirchmeier, Casting a Wider Net, supra note
4, at 18-25; Kirchmeier, Aggravating and Mitigating Factors, supra note 4, at 400-30. These aggra-
vating factors may be considered either at the sentencing stage or the trial stage. See Lowenfeld v.
Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 233 (1988).
123. See, e.g., Kirchmeier, Aggravating and Mitigating Factors, supra note 4, at 400-15.
124. See, e.g., id. at 381-86, 420-30; Kirchmeier, Casting a Wider Net, supra note 4, at 23-25.
125. Payne, 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
126. Id. at 827. The Payne decision overruled previous Court holdings that such evidence did
violate the Eighth Amendment. See Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987); South Carolina v.
Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989). In those overruled decisions, the Court had reasoned that the admis-
sion of victim impact evidence "could result in imposing the death sentence because of factors about
which the defendant was unaware, and that were irrelevant to the decision to kill." Gathers, 490 U.S.
at 811 (quoting Booth, 482 U.S. at 505).
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ment on the murder's effects on the victim's family. 127  Although the Su-
preme Court only held that the Constitution does not bar such evidence,
several state legislatures have passed laws specifically allowing for such
evidence. 128
Historically, both judges and jurors have played a significant role in
the life-and-death decisions in capital cases at trial. In the past, the Su-
preme Court sanctioned the practice of sentencing by judges in capital
cases. 129 But more recently the Court has held that jurors must make the
findings regarding factors that make a defendant eligible for the death pe-
nalty. 130
In addition to considering aggravating or death-eligibility factors, ju-
rors also consider mitigating evidence presented by the defendant. Miti-
gating factors are used to argue that the defendant should spend life in
prison instead of being executed. "1 These circumstances may help ex-
plain, but not excuse, the defendant's conduct. 32 These factors may also
illustrate good qualities of the defendant, show the defendant did not play
a large part in the murder, or explain why fairness demands a sentence
other than death.133
Beginning with the trial for murder, death is discussed throughout a
capital case. The death of the victim is an ever present topic, and when
prosecutors introduce victim impact evidence in capital cases, they may
expect jurors to put themselves in the place of the family or the deceased.
Beyond the discussion that occurs in non-capital murder cases, jurors are
constantly reminded during sentencing that the defendant's life is at stake
and that they have power over that life.
Thus, capital cases always contain reminders of death, and it is one
area of the law where the subconscious motivations discussed in Parts I
and II are especially relevant. Although little has been written about ter-
ror management theory or Ernest Becker in legal scholarship, a few au-
thors have noted the connection between the death penalty system as a
whole and terror management theory.134 Professor Donald P. Judges has
127. Payne, 502 U.S. at 827.
128. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 163.150(3) (a) (B) (2007); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(7) (West
2007).
129. See, e.g., Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990).
130. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 588 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring).
131. See, e.g., Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 606-09 (1978) (discusses mitigating factors and
holds that states may not bar consideration of mitigation)
132. See Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, A Tear in the Eye of the Law: Mitigating Factors and the Progres-
sion Toward a Disease Theory of Criminal Justice [hereinafter A Tear in the Eye of the Law], 83 OR.
L. REV. 631, 656-87 (2004) (discusses categories of mitigating factors).
133. See id.
134. See Glenn L. Pierce and Michael L. Radelet, The Role and Consequences of the Death Penal-
ty in American Politics, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 711, 723-24 (1990/1991) (using terror
management theory in discussion of politicians use of the death penalty to increase public fears or
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noted that in capital cases the presence of death in the case is likely to re-
sult in excessively punitive reactions. 135 Professor Judges proposed "that
American capital punishment is largely a nonconscious, symbolic defense
against the terror that accompanies awareness of human mortality." 136
Professor Judges noted that the death penalty itself contains "the ne-
cessary ingredients for activation of the terror management effect: a re-
minder of mortality, time to push awareness of it to the fringes of con-
sciousness, and an opportunity to indulge in punitive and often authorita-
rian aggression against an offending target person." 137 The result, accord-
ing to Prof. Judges, is that the death penalty system functions as a ritualis-
tic human sacrifice that is legalized by subconscious motivations beyond
the understanding of judges, legislators, executives and the public.'38
Although Profrofessor Judges ended his article with pessimism for the
future, this Article considers how there may be some hope by using effec-
tive strategies in individual cases. The larger hope emerges from a faith
in education on a broad scale, and hope exists in the courtroom if attor-
neys and judges are armed with an understanding of the underlying moti-
vations at work.
V. TERROR MANAGEMENT THEORIES APPLY IN CAPITAL TRIALS
In summary, Ernest Becker's theories, supported by the terror man-
agement studies, consist of several principles. First, because of their in-
telligence, humans face the terrifying knowledge of their own animalness
and the inevitability of death. Second, the concept of the reality of death
is overwhelming. Third, in order to survive the terror of reality, humans
attempt to push the knowledge of death to their subconscious. Fourth, as
humans try to push this fear to the subconscious, they try to deal with the
fear of death by seeking self-esteem, character, material goods, culture,
belief systems, and other structures that appear to give control of death or
attach them to immortality devices. In humans' attempt to seek immortali-
ty and to deny animalness, humans struggle against insignificance and seek
to be heroes. Fifth, reminders of one's own mortality that sink into the
subconscious make us cling to our belief systems and make us more hos-
tile to others who threaten those belief systems. Sixth, when other humans
threaten one's immortality devices, such as when others believe in immor-
tality devices that are inconsistent with one's beliefs, the others threaten
mortality); Wayne A. Logan, Casting New Light on an Old Subject: Death Penalty Abolitionism for a
New Millennium, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1336, 1368 n. 156 (2002).
135. Judges, supra note 23, at 161.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 246-48.
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one's protections against the fear of death. So humans seek to destroy
those "evil" threats. 139
With this process being played out in various venues of life, it is not
surprising that the process also works in the courtroom. Experiments have
begun to show how this process takes place in law. Although further stu-
dies are needed, in capital cases there are significant reminders of death
that affect the cases. Legal scholars, attorneys and judges should be aware
of how these effects play out in the courtroom.
Together, the subconscious fear of death is at least partly responsible
for the existence of the punishment and its unfair application. The sec-
tions below highlight areas where the subconscious fear of death plays a
role during capital trials, with a focus on: (1) the relationship between
terror management and the selection of capital jurors; and (2) the terror
management effects on how jurors make their sentencing decisions.
A. Terror Management and Capital Jury Selection
Capital jurors, who play a key role in the determination of who is ex-
ecuted and who lives, must favor the death penalty in order to serve on the
jury. Considering the terror management studies, a capital jury consists of
people who may be more susceptible to mortality salience than the general
population.
During the selection of jurors from members of the venire, under the
Sixth Amendment, potential jurors may be removed for cause if for some
reason they cannot be fair jurors. In Wainwright v. Witt,140 the Supreme
Court addressed when a juror may be excluded for cause based upon the
juror's views about the death penalty. The Court in Witt clarified that a
member of the venire may be excluded for cause if the person has views
on the death penalty that "would 'prevent or substantially impair the per-
formance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instruction and
oath."",141 Jurors who would refuse to convict a defendant in a capital case
or would not consider the death penalty as a possible punishment may be
removed from the jury for cause.
The Court also has considered the timing of the death qualification
procedure. In Lockhart v. McCree,142 the capital defendant challenged the
pre-trial practice of death-qualifying a unitary jury, which decides both
guilt and sentence. The defendant argued that the death qualification
process pertains to a jury's infliction of punishment and therefore it should
139. See supra Section I and II.
140. 469 U.S. 412 (1985).
141. Witt, 469 U.S. at 424 (quoting Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45 (1980)). See generally
Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968). Similarly, a potential juror who will always vote for
death may also be struck for cause. Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719 (1992).
142. 476 U.S. 162 (1986).
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not be done as a prerequisite for jurors to judge guilt.143  The defendant
was concerned because studies show that death-qualified juries are predis-
posed toward guilt.' 44 The Court rejected the defendant's Sixth and Eighth
Amendment challenges, and the Court noted that there were benefits to
having the same jury decide guilt and punishment, such as judicial econo-
my. 145
Thus, in order for a state to ensure that jurors will follow the law, po-
tential jurors must be death qualified before they may serve on a jury.
The result of these decisions is that potential jurors who are against the
death penalty cannot serve on a jury in a capital case during the sentencing
phase. And, in most situations such potential jurors will not be permitted
to sit as a juror in a capital case during the guilt phase.
Because all jurors who sit on capital cases must be willing to impose
the death penalty, terror management theories that help explain why
people support capital punishment give some insight into the jurors who sit
on capital cases. This insight is important because many people who sup-
port the death penalty do so based upon views about morality and retribu-
tion rather than upon policy and empirical evidence. 146 Therefore, wheth-
er or not a potential juror gets to sit on a capital case is largely determined
by the person's culture and views of morality. 147
Terror management theory illustrates how a cultural fear of death
leads to support for the societal infliction of death. Scholars have noted
that our epic tales of heroes appeal to the populace because the stories of
redemptive violence allow us to "identify with the protagonist and expe-
rience the power of controlling death." 148  Psychologists have reasoned
that similarly, "Capital punishment symbolically allows the state to re-
move the power of taking life from those who do so arbitrarily (offenders)
and give it to those who will use it in a more predictable manner (at least
theoretically) that is socially sanctioned (the state itself is delegating the
power to the jury)." 149 Therefore, "individuals are afforded some protec-
tion from death by the removal of the offender from society and by their
own adherence to the laws of society. 5o
143. Id. at 167.
144. Id. at 178.
145. Id. at 180.
146. Symposium. The Role of Organized Religions in Changing Death Penalty Debates, 9 WM. &
MARY BILL RTs. J. 201, 213 (2000) (stating that "in recent years the number one argument in favor of
the death penalty has become retribution").
147. Id. "Unlike issues of cost, deterrence, and future dangerousness, retribution is not an issue
that is empirical .... How much we all deserve ... is a cultural determination greatly influenced by
prevailing standards of morality." Id. at 213. Prof. Radelet concludes that because "retribution rests
on more of a moral base than on an empirical one, it is fundamentally a question that religious deno-
minations need to address." Id. at 214.
148. Arndt et al., Terror Management in the Courtroom, supra note 94, at 432.
149. Id.
150. Id.
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Because the subconscious fear of death may make people more puni-
tive and hostile toward others who are different from them, this subcons-
cious fear helps explain one of the reasons that people, including capital
jurors, support the death penalty,' 51 The structuralized killing that takes
place when a person is executed allows members of society to see death as
something that is within their control. Becker referred to public execution
as "a controlled display of dying." 152 In the context of discussing crucifix-
ion, he noted, "The longer people looked at the death of someone else, the
more pleasure they could have in sensing the security and the good fortune
of their own survival. 153
One legal scholar has noted the connection between the subconscious
fear of death and support for the death penalty. Prof. Judges reasoned that
"[t]error management theory . . . provides an account of the psychological
defense mechanism that may be the driving force behind capital punish-
ment. 154 He explained that capital punishment involves a ritual control of
death; it projects undesired qualities onto the defendant; the defendant is
chosen in part based on outsider characteristics; and through capital pu-
nishment the hated and feared qualities are symbolically destroyed. 155
Under Becker's theories and terror management theory, then, the
death-qualified jurors who serve on capital cases may be more susceptible
to mortality salience, resulting in a jury that is more punitive than a non-
capital jury would be. Various studies confirm that death qualified jurors
who favor the death penalty do tend to be more likely to find a defendant
guilty than jurors who oppose the death penalty. 156 Data show that "death
qualification makes juries more conviction-prone, more death-prone, less
representative, and less accurate in fact-finding. ,15 7
151. The subconscious fear of death and support for the death penalty may be aggravated by news
reports about violence. Dr. Sheldon Solomon and others have written about how acts of violence may
affect people in different ways, including how people vote. See, e.g., Florette Cohen et al., American
Roulette, supra note 81, at 177; See also IN THE WAKE OF 9/11, supra note 50, at 191-93.
152. BECKER, ESCAPE FROM EVIL, supra note 27, at 110 (emphasis in original).
153. Id.
154. Judges, supra note 23, at 186-87.
155. Id. at 186. Capital punishment has been called a ritualistic killing that is similar to human
sacrifice. Id. at 185. Prof. Judges argued that "capital-punishment-as-sacrifice symbolically expresses
the extra-human, mortality-controlling potency of the sovereign and is an institution people readily
identify with in order to establish an anxiety-buffering association with a transvital entity. It also
permits authoritarian aggression against the outgroup embodiment of feared and hated attributes,
which, under terror management theory, would be the expected response to incipient mortality aware-
ness combined with threat to worldview." Id. at 186.
156. See, e.g., James S. Liebman, The Overproduction of Death, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 2030,
2097 n. 164 (2000); Susan D. Rozelle, The Utility of Witt: Understanding the Language of Death
Qualification, 54 BAYLOR L. REV. 677, 692-96 (2002); Joseph W. Filkins et a]., An Evaluation of the
Biasing Effects of Death Qualification: A Meta-Analytic/Computer Simulation Approach, in THEORY
AND RESEARCH ON SMALL GROUPS 153, 153-75 (R. Scott Tindale et al. eds., 1998).
157. Susan D. Rozelle, The Principled Executioner: Capital Juries' Bias and the Benefits of True
Bifurcation [hereinafter The Principled Executioner], 38 ARiz. ST. L. J. 769, 781 (2006). See also
Richard Salgado, Note, Tribunals Organized to Convict: Searching for a Lesser Evil in the Capital
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The finding that death-qualified jurors are more punitive than other ju-
rors is consistent with terror management theory. Terror management
psychologists need to do further research to explore the links between pro-
death penalty jurors and the bias toward convictions, but their studies in
other areas do raise the possibility of a link and help explain why jurors
who favor the death penalty are more punitive than other jurors.
B. Terror Management and Why Jurors May Vote for Death
Once jurors who are susceptible to mortality salience are selected for a
capital trial and sentencing, they are exposed to reminders of their animal-
ness and their mortality. These reminders, in turn, may make them more
punitive. 158
1. Mortality Salience Occurs in Capital Cases
Psychologists have noted that jurors can be reminded about their mor-
tality in a number of ways during trial. Reminders may come from such
aspects as "the nature of the charge, the details of testimony, or the sen-
tence that may be considered."'' 59  A closing argument also may remind
jurors of their mortality in criminal cases. 160
The entire capital sentencing hearing is unintentionally designed to
remind the jurors of their mortality.' 61 During the sentencing hearing, the
emphasis is on the way the death of the victim occurred, the victim's life,
and whether the defendant should be killed. Although it is unavoidable
that jurors will have to think about the murder, the prosecutor may also
try to make the jurors feel connected to the dead victim. 162  The defense
attorney may try to make the jurors relate to the defendant whose life is in
Juror Death-Qualification Process in United States v. Green, 2005 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 519, 528-33
(2005).
158. Beyond reminders of death that are present in individual capital trials, others have noted that
during certain historical events, death is especially salient, and thus will result in more punitive juries.
Arndt et al., Terror Management in the Courtroom, supra note 94, at 432. For example, during
times of war, support for the death penalty often increases. See Kirchmeier, Another Place Beyond
Here, supra note 2, at 10-11. One explanation for the increase is that the population is reminded of
death during wartime, and thus people address their subconscious fear of death by clinging to capital
punishment, which offers one the illusion of control over death.
159. Arndt et al., Terror Management in the Courtroom, supra note 94, at 427. In addition to
being reminded of their mortality, details from experts and photographs about the causes of death and
infliction of wounds will also remind jurors of what Becker called their "creatureliness." BECKER,
DENIAL OF DEATH, supra note 27, at 87.
160. See Alison Cook et al., Terror Management in the Courtroom, supra note 94, at 407.
161. "[T]he most overt way that mortality may become salient to jurors is probably in the penalty
phase of a bifurcated murder trial in which capital punishment is an option." Arndt et al., Terror
Management in the Courtroom, supra note 94, at 412.
162. See id. at 421-22 (noting effects of prosecutors encouraging participants in study to consider
their own deaths).
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question. The death reminders are unavoidable in a capital trial, but the
additional attempts to make the jurors relate to the dead victim and the
capital defendant are further likely to make the jurors think about their
own death.
In addition to the death reminders in the capital sentencing process,
there often is time for those thoughts of mortality to creep into a juror's
subconscious. Another commentator has noted that the death sentencing
process is an ideal incubator for mortality salience: Capital jurors are
reminded of the death of the victim and the mortality of the defendant;
trials deal with non-death issues that create the necessary distractions to
allow for mortality thoughts to inhabit the subconscious; and jurors are in
a stressful decision-making situation.163
Thus, the influences of mortality salience may occur in capital cases.
Jurors are reminded of death, the thoughts of death may go into their sub-
conscious, and then the jurors must decide the fate of the defendant, who
is someone most likely very different from the jurors. These reminders of
death may have various effects on jurors, such as jurors using various
defenses to avoid directly considering their own mortality. 64
2. The Effects of Mortality Salience in Capital Trials
As the studies on terror management theory reveal, once mortality sa-
lience occurs and when reminders of death are in an individual's subcons-
cious, that individual is likely to be more hostile and punitive to those who
are different. 65  In capital cases, the defendant is often quite different
from the jurors. A capital defendant, generally, may likely be poor, may
be mentally ill, may be of a different race than the jurors, and may likely
live a different life and have different world views from the jurors. 166
The terror management effects on jurors may help explain various
phenomena revealed in other studies about capital cases, although further
studies will help show how these effects occur in individual cases. For
example, many scholars have noted that the death penalty is used against
the outcasts of society, 167 and a number of studies have found the existence
163. Judges, supra note 23, at 186.
164. Arndt et al., Terror Management in the Courtroom, supra note 94 at 427-28.
165. See id. at 413-24. "[Tlhoughts of death intensify worldview-supportive biases, and capital
cases may increase thoughts of mortality, through both the charge on file and the punishment options."
Id. at 432.
166. See, e.g., Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, A Tear in the Eye of the Law, supra note 132, at 688-93.
167. See, e.g., Dora W. Klein, Categorical Exclusions from Capital Punishment, 72 BROOK. L.
REv. 1211, 1211 (2007) (noting that "defendants who are poor, or black, or whose victims were
white, are disproportionately likely to be sentenced to death"); Corinna Barrett Lain, Furman Funda-
mentals, 82 WASH. L. REv. 1, 6 (2007) (noting the concern of the Justices in Furman that the death
penalty is used against the poor, the despised, those without political clout, and those who are mem-
bers of a suspect or unpopular minority).
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of racial bias in capital cases. 168  The studies show that the race of the
victim is a significant factor in capital sentencing in that those who kill
white victims are more likely to get the death penalty than those who kill
people of other races.169  When the death penalty was used for the crime
of rape, almost 90% of those executed for that crime were black. 7 ° Simi-
larly, lynching was used predominantly against black men.17' The racial
scapegoating, in part, can be explained by Becker's theories and the re-
search supporting his theories. 17 2
The discriminatory use of the death penalty is not limited to instances
involving race. As Clinton Duffy, a former warden at San Quentin Pris-
on, noted, "[t]he death penalty is the privilege of the poor. " 173  Among
other reasons, indigent capital defendants often receive poor representa-
tion, '14 but part of the reason for poor representation may come from a
hostility toward outsiders that permeates the system. For example, one
study found that judges were more likely to find a defendant guilty when
the defendant was from a lower economic class. '15 Another report con-
cluded that "[a]s long as the political process governs decision making in
regard to capital punishment, the death penalty will continue to be applied
as it always has been, to America's powerless: racial minorities, the poor
168. See ROGER HOOD, THE DEATH PENALTY: A WORLDWIDE. PERSPECTIVE 169 (2d rev. &
updated ed. 1996); Theodore Eisenberg et al., Forecasting Life and Death: Juror Race, Religion, and
Attitude Toward the Death Penalty, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 277, 308 (2001) (noting that when the defen-
dant is black, white jurors are more likely to vote for death than black jurors). See also generally
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481U.S. 279 (1987) (considering Baldus study finding racial discrimination in
Georgia capital sentencing system); William J. Bowers et al., Crossing Racial Boundaries: A Closer
Look at the Roots of Racial Bias in Capital Sentencing when the Defendant is Black and the Victim is
White, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1497, 1515 (2004).
169. See HOOD, supra note 168, at 169 ("Those who kill white persons are considerably more
likely to be sentence to death than those who kill blacks, regardless of the race of the defendant.").
The United States General Accounting Office in 1990 reviewed twenty-eight studies and found that in
82% of the studies that the race of the victim influenced the likelihood that a defendant would be
charged with capital murder. Id. at 172 (citing Death Penalty Sentencing: Research Indicates Pattern
of Racial Disparities, U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, GAO/GDD-90-57, at 6 (Feb. 1990)).
170. Wolfgang, Racial Discrimination in the Death Sentence for Rape, in EXECUTIONS IN
AMERICA 110-20 (W. Bowers ed. 1974)
171. ROBERT L. ZANGRANDO, THE NAACP CRUSADE AGAINST LYNCHING, 1909-1950 4 (1980).
172. "The existence of race effects supports the hypothesis that capital punishment is infected with
authoritarian processes and, by inference, the claim that the terror management effect is at work."
Judges, supra note 23, at 220.
173. Clinton Duffy, Where the Bodies Meet the Road, in A PUNISHMENT IN SEARCH OF A CRIME:
AMERICANS SPEAK OUT AGAINST THE DEATH PENALTY 119 (Ian Gray & Moira Stanley eds., 1989).
Similarly, Justice Marshall noted that "the burden of capital punishment falls upon the poor, the igno-
rant, and the under privileged members of society." Furman, 408, U.S. at 365-66 (Marshall, J.,
concurring).
174. See, e.g., Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst
Crime But for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L. J. 1835, 1835 (1994). In many states, poor people
facing the death penalty may be assigned an inexperienced attorney, an attorney reluctant to defend a
capital murderer, or an attorney with no expertise in criminal or capital punishment law. Id. n. 50-60.
175. Peter Blanck et al., The Appearance of Justice: Judges' Verbal & Nonverbal Behavior in
Criminal Jury Trials, 38 STAN. L. REV. 89, 139-42 (1985).
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and the mentally disabled." 176  Similarly, gay and lesbian capital defen-
dants have faced prosecutors who have used sexual orientation to inflame
jurors against the defendants.177
Another way discriminatory results may occur is that the effects of
mortality salience may influence how jurors consider mitigating evidence.
Recent studies reveal that different jurors give different amounts of weight
to different types of mitigation, 78 and part of that difference may result
from different jurors having different self-esteem levels. Still, thoughts of
death may result in the juror being biased against either the defendant or
the victim if either of them presents a worldview threat to the juror. 179
For example, some jurors show hostility toward capital defendants who
are mentally ill or who have a substance abuse problem even though those
factors should be considered as mitigating. '80 On the other hand, for some
jurors, individual juror characteristics, such as a juror's level of self-
esteem, may diminish the effect of mortality reminders during a trial.' 81
In summary, the terror management research and Becker's theories
are consistent with the result that the death penalty is used against the poor
and powerless by those in power. First, pro death penalty jurors who are
susceptible to mortality salience are selected. Then, they are reminded of
death repeatedly, and time is given for the reminders to infect their sub-
conscious. These jurors then decide the fate of someone who appears to
be quite different from them. 182  Thus, a murder defendant may threaten
176. Michael Kroll, Conclusion, Chatahoochee Judicial District: Buckle of the Death Belt: The
Death Penalty in Microcosm, available at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid =45&did=540.
177. See, e.g., State v. Grannis, 900 P.2d I (Ariz. 1995) (reversing conviction and death sentence
of co-defendants because at trial prosecutor introduced photographs of male homosexual pornography
found in one of the defendant's closets); Ruthan Robson, Lesbianism and the Death Penalty: A "Hard
Core" Case, 32 WOMEN'S STUD. Q. 181, 181 (2004) (noting "Bernina Mata was sentenced to death in
Illinois in 1999 for being a lesbian - or, as the prosecutor labeled her, a 'hard core lesbian'").
178. See generally Stephen P. Garvey, Aggravation and Mitigation in Capital Cases: What Do
Jurors Think?, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 1538 (1998).
179. Arndt et al., Terror Management in the Courtroom, supra note 94, at 428. See also David C.
Baldus et al., Racial Discrimination and the Death Penalty in the Post-Furman Era: An Empirical and
Legal Overview, with Recent Findings from Philadelphia, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 1638, 1715 (1998)
(finding that defendants with victims of more than minimal socio-economic status are more likely to
receive the death penalty than defendants with victims of low economic status).
180. John M. Fabian, Death Penalty Mitigation and the Role of the Forensic Psychologist, 27 LAW
& PSYCHOL. REv. 73, 90 (2003) ("Specifically, mental illness, substance abuse, and having a deprived
and abusive childhood, factors that would appear to be mitigating and arising sympathy, may be
viewed as aggravating and suggestive of future dangerousness.").
181. "In addition to the buffering effects of self-esteem, recent research has found that bolstering
participants' belief in an afterlife as a form of literal immortality-and, thus, directly targeting the
threat of death as absolute annihilation-can attenuate MS-induced bias in legal decisions." Arndt et
al., Terror Management in the Courtroom, supra note 94, at 428 (citation omitted).
182. See, e.g., Craig Haney, Condemning the Other in Death Penalty Trials: Biographical Rac-
ism, Structural Mitigation, and the Empathetic Divide, 53 DEPAUL L. REv. 1557, 1558 (2004) (stating
that jurors have a "relative inability to perceive capital defendants as enough like themselves to readily
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the immortality devices the jurors have built to protect them against their
fears. Further study is needed, but the current studies are consistent with
a conclusion that the consideration of death in capital cases make jurors
hostile to those with different background and cultures, explaining the
resulting subconscious discrimination based upon factors such as race,
poverty, class and sexual orientation.
VI. TERROR MANAGEMENT THEORIES APPLY IN CAPITAL CASES POST-
TRIAL
The terror management effects in capital cases do not end at trial.
Appellate and post-conviction judges are also confronted with their sub-
conscious fears of death. Additionally, death fears affect other partici-
pants in the capital punishment system.
A. Appellate and Post-Conviction Judges and Death183
Judicial opinions in death penalty cases are written in a context ripe
for terror management effects. Appellate judges are reminded of death
from reviewing the record, which likely makes them consider their own
mortality. 184  While the judges work on writing their opinions, they con-
centrate on legal standards in a way that allows the direct thoughts of
death to inhabit their subconscious.1 85  The resulting subconscious terror
management effects of death reminders can make judges more hostile to-
ward outsiders like capital defendants.18 6  As shown by the experiment
with the Tucson judges who evaluated prostitution cases after being
feel any of their pains, to appreciate the true nature of the struggles they have faced, or to genuinely
understand how and why their lives have taken very different courses from the jurors' own.").
183. Studies have shown a large number of reversals of capital cases on appeals and in post-
conviction. See generally James S. Liebman et al., A Broken System: Error Rates in Capital Cases,
1973-1995 (1995), available at http://www2.law.columbia.edu/instructionalservices/liebman/; James
S. Liebman et al., A Broken System, Part II: Why There Is So Much Error in Capital Cases, and
What Can Be Done About it (2002), available at
http://www2.law.columbia.edu/brokensystem2/index2.html. One implication from that result is that
the trial courts and juries are historically more punitive than the appellate judges, and that result may
arise from the type of mortality salience that exists where the death evidence is more direct and less
removed at the trial level. More studies in this area would help clarify the difference in mortality
salience effects at different court levels.
184. "[Jludges deal pain and death. . . . From John Winthrop through Warren Burger they have
sat atop a pyramid of violence." Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L. J. 1601, 1609
(1986).
185. See William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV.
780, 790 (2006) (noting capital punishment constitutional legal analysis regulates "procedure heavily
and substance lightly").
186. See supra Section II. Additionally, judges, as representatives of the law, might be prompted
by reminders of death to be more sympathetic to other representatives of the law, such as prosecutors.
Others have noted that judges in criminal cases are "likely to view the prosecutor in a more favorable
light than defense counsel." WELSH WHITE, THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE NINETIES 119 (1991).
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primed with thoughts of death, these effects can make judges more puni-
tive. 87
As discussed earlier, studies show that the main effects of terror man-
agement occur when one considers one's death unconsciously. In most
capital cases, the concepts of death, like the priming surveys in the expe-
riments, are easily pushed to the subconscious. The reason that thoughts
of death may go to the subconscious in capital cases is that in most cases,
judges are considering procedural and constitutional issues that take the
main focus away from death.
For the most part, appellate capital opinions do not dwell on death in a
conscious manner, making most opinions likely influenced by the subcons-
cious terror management effects. Professor James Liebman has con-
cluded, "Capital punishment is tailor-made for judicial detachment." 188
Similarly, he has noted that in capital cases, "the meaning of the judge's
act has little to do with the judge's legal interpretation and everything to
do with something the judge 'almost never makes a part of the . . . opi-
nion': 'the overwhelming reality of the pain and fear that is suffered.'"1 89
Like other appellate courts, rarely does the United States Supreme
Court examine the death penalty as being about death. Understandably,
the majority of opinions address the death penalty in terms of procedures,
allowing the Justices to avoid fully contemplating the death they are order-
ing, making most decisions ripe for terror management influences. The
Court does acknowledge that "death is different."' 90 Yet, the Court uses
that phrase so often it assumes that the reader understands it, and the
Court does not go on to dwell on why death is different or on what death
means physically, mentally, and spiritually. 191
Consider a recent Supreme Court decision such as Roper v. Sim-
mons, 192 where the Court found that it violates the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments to execute those who committed murder while they were
under the age of eighteen. The references to death throughout the majori-
187. See supra Section 11.
188. James S. Liebman, Slow Dancing With Death: The Supreme Court and Capital Punishment,
1963-2006, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 98 (2007). Professor Liebman noted that in condoning the vi-
olence of the death penalty, the Supreme Court Justices use detachment techniques in their opinions
such as: not deciding issues, performing mechanical analysis of claims, transforming substantive
review of a case into a procedural review of the case, insulating themselves from the issues, and over-
stating the consequences of ruling against the state. Id. at 101-05.
189. Id. at 95-96 (quoting Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 Yale L.J. 1601 (1986),
reprinted in NARRATIVE, VIOLENCE, AND THE LAW 238 (Martha Minow et al. eds., 1992)).
190. See, e.g., Gregg, supra note 122, at 188 (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.) (stat-
ing "penalty of death is different in kind from any other punishment"); Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S.
447, 459 (1984) (noting the "qualitative difference of the death penalty"); Ring, supra note 6, at 605-
06 (2002) (stating that "no doubt that '[dleath is different") (citation omitted).
191. See cases cited in previous footnote. Id.
192. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
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ty opinion are only in the context of phrases like "death penalty," 193 "sen-
tence of death," 194 and "death eligibility." 195
The only time the Roper majority opinion contemplates the cold reality
of death is in a reference to trial testimony from the victim's family mem-
bers about "the devastation her death had brought to their lives." 196 As in
other cases, such as the victim impact case Payne v. Tennessee, the Court
seems more willing to contemplate the realities of death in the context of
the victim than in the context of the life it is judging. 197 But in discussing
the defendant, the Court mainly uses the term "death" in the context of
technical legal phrases like "death penalty" or "death sentence. "' 98
Roper is a case where a reader might have expected the Justices to
discuss death more than they did. The case came out in favor of the de-
fendant, 99 and it included a topic where more discussion of the reality of
death in the context of deterrence would have had legal relevance. The
Court did acknowledge that juveniles might be deterred less than adults by
the threat of death, but it did not expound upon how juveniles might con-
template death. 20
This discussion is not to criticize the Court for not dwelling on the re-
ality of death. On a legal analysis level, it arguably often makes sense for
the Court not to waste time on a discussion of the death of the defendant
and for the Court instead to focus on the procedural analysis of the law
and the case.
The point, however, is that Supreme Court Justices -- and other state
and federal appellate judges - are doing the same procedural type of anal-
ysis they would do in any case for capital cases even though the capital
cases are about the past death of the victim and the future death of the
defendant. Thus, the appellate decisions of judges, perhaps even more so
than trial court decisions, are made in ideal conditions of mortality sa-
lience and terror management. The ideas of death are present. The con-
cepts of death are avoided and pushed back to the subconscious. There is
then a risk that these influences add significant arbitrary factors to judicial
opinions.'°
193. See, e.g., id. at 557-76.
194. See, e.g., id. at 572.
195. See, e.g., id. at 574.
196. Id. at 558.
197. Payne, 501 U.S. at 812-16.
198. Id. at 817-27.
199. Under terror management theory, one would expect judges to be less punitive and more likely
to come out in favor of the defendant when the judges directly confront the reality of death than in
cases where judges are reminded of death but able to put it in their subconscious.
200. Roper, 543 U.S. 570-71 (2005).
201. A counterargument, however, arises from the testing that indicates that some people who
encounter reminders of mortality are likely to embrace systems such as the legal system. See discus-
sion supra Section II. Judges who have devoted their life to legal training and upholding the legal
system, then, seem more likely than jurors to strictly follow the law when faced with thoughts of
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By contrast, some Supreme Court opinions do analyze the death penal-
ty with more awareness of death than other opinions, and thus these deci-
sions may have less terror management influences. In Furman v. Geor-
gia,2°2 Justice Brennan discussed the death penalty in terms of "the con-
scious infliction of physical pain,"20 3 the "mental pain" caused by the an-
ticipation of death,2 4 the destruction of one's "very existence,"2 5 and as
"degrading to human dignity. "206
Justice Brennan was somewhat rare as a Supreme Court Justice in his
willingness to write about the reality of death. In another context, one
scholar has noted that in a termination of life-support case, unlike most
other Justices and lower court judges, Justice Brennan dealt honestly with
the "taboo nature of death" and dared "to put the spiritual meaning of
death in the same sentence with the Constitution. ,207
Justice Brennan realized that he viewed death differently than most of
his colleagues.20 8 Perhaps because he did not push the reality of death into
his subconscious, Justice Brennan continued to vote against the infliction
of the death penalty throughout his career on the bench.20 9
There are three categories of Supreme Court cases that are more likely
to consciously delve into the terror of death and the contemplation of mor-
tality than other cases. In these opinions, the idea of death may not be
relegated to the subconscious, and thus one might expect less terror man-
death. Therefore, when considering terror management theory, decisions by judges are less likely to
be arbitrary than decisions by jurors. The experiment on the Tucson judges, however, is inconsistent
with this theory, so further testing would be useful.
202. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1971).
203. Id. at 288 (Brennan, J., concurring).
204. Id.
205. Id. at 290.
206. Id. at 291.
207. Louise Harmon, Fragments on the Deathwatch, 77 MINN. L. REv. 1, 126, 128 (1992) (dis-
cussing Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990)). Professor Harmon noted
that the writers of the state appellate opinions addressing the issue of termination of life support for
Nancy Cruzan "treated the subject of death just like any other subject about which a court might have
to infer intent." Id. She added that Justice Stevens, like Justice Brennan, directly addressed death in a
Curzan dissent. She stated, "I am grateful for those dissents. It is so important for me to see Su-
preme Court justices acknowledge the difficult and risky nature of death talk; to address the members
of the deathwatch and their pain; to dare to put the spiritual meaning of death in the same sentence
with the Constitution." Id. at 128.
208. Looking back more than ten years after Furman, Justice Brennan remembered in a law review
article how Chief Justice Burger in Furman had distinguished capital punishment from burning at the
stake. William J. Brennan, Jr., Constitutional Adjudication and the Death Penalty: A View from the
Court, 100 HARV. L. REv. 313, 330 (1986). But Justice Brennan believed there was no difference:
"Furman might have been characterized not as a case about the death penalty, but rather as a case
about death by electrocution, which might fairly be described as 'frying in a chair.' How would frying
in a chair be distinguished from burning at a stake?" Id. (citation omitted).
209. Justice Marshall also voted against the death penalty in every capital case during his term.
See, e.g., Furman, supra note 11, at 358-59, 360 (MarstL',, J., concurring). Justice Brennan contin-
ued to denounce the death penalty following his retirell I until his death. See Linda Greenhouse,
William Brennan, 91, Dies; Gave Court Liberal Vision, N. x TiMES, July 25, 1997, at B6.
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agement influences in comparison to the procedure-oriented cases. These
categories of capital cases with issues that directly confront death are: (1)
cases considering execution methods; (2) cases about a defendant's compe-
tency to be executed; and (3) cases that consider the overall constitutio-
nality of the death penalty.
First, an area where one might expect more discussion of death is in
the few Court opinions evaluating execution methods because the constitu-
tional analysis of execution methods requires consideration of the infliction
of death. In evaluating whether a punishment violates the Eighth Amend-
ment, the Court considers whether a punishment is excessive. In addition
to considering contemporary standards through legislative trends, the Su-
preme Court opinions have considered that: "the punishment must not
involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain;" 210 and "the pu-
nishment must not be grossly out of proportion to the severity of the
crime., 211  Most recently, in assessing the procedures used in lethal injec-
tion cases, a Plurality of the Court considered whether alternative killing
methods "significantly reduce a substantial risk of severe pain. ,,21 2
These inquiries seem ripe for contemplation of the killing process, but
the Supreme Court generally has not lingered on the ways that death oc-
curs even in the limited number of execution method cases.21 3 In 1879,
the Court unanimously upheld a sentence of public execution by firing
squad by focusing on the history of execution methods instead of a consid-
eration of what happens to one or one's soul when a bullet pierces the
flesh.21 4 Similarly, in In re Kemmler,215 when the Court evaluated the
constitutionality of the electric chair, the main focus was upon constitu-
tional history.21 6
210. Gregg, 428 U.S. 173 (1976). The execution method cases do raise the question of why
society and the Justices reject excessive pain. Perhaps the excessive pain makes the death more real.
Although most defendants might prefer a limited period of pain to death, our society will not tolerate
punishments that inflict any pain while we do tolerate punishments of death. One wonders whether it
is because we are able to subconsciously ignore death.
211. Id. See generally Deborah W. Denno, Getting to Death: Are Executions Constitutional?, 82
IOWA L. REv. 319, 353 (1997).
212. Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1532 (2008) (plurality).
213. See, e.g., Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637 (2004) (considering whether a defendant could
bring under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 an Eighth Amendment challenge to a state's "cut-down" procedure to
access a defendant's veins to use lethal injection). The Supreme Court has not struck down any execu-
tion method as violating the Eighth Amendment. See Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Let's Make a Deal:
Waiving the Eighth Amendment by Selecting a Cruel and Unusual Punishment [hereinafter Let's Make
a Deal, 32 CONN. L. REv. 615, 628 (2000). The Court has noted in dicta, however, that punish-
ments such as beheading, public dissection and burning alive would violate the Eighth Amendment.
See Furman, supra note 11, at 264 (Brennan, J., concurring); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 136
(1878); In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 446-47 (1890) (addressing in dicta the punishments of burning
at the stake, crucifixion, and breaking on the wheel).
214. Wilkerson, 99 U.S. 132-36.
215. In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436.
216. Id. at 445-49.
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Some individual Justices have written opinions in execution method
cases that do consider the process of death, though they do not contem-
plate what occurs after death or the fear of the permanence of death. In
Gomez v. United States District Court,2 17 the Court held that a challenge to
execution by cyanide gas was not properly raised.218 In that case, Justice
Stevens wrote a dissenting opinion where he documented the brutal execu-
tion of Don Harding in Arizona.21 9 Similarly, in a dissent from a denial of
a petition for writ of certiorari in Glass v. Louisiana,22 ° Justice Brennan
discussed the evidence that "suggests that death by electrical current is
extremely violent and inflicts pain and indignities far beyond the 'mere
extinguishment of life., 221  In great detail, Justice Brennan recounted
witnesses' descriptions of contortions, eyes popping, defecation, and
smells of burning flesh, etc., in a way that consciously contemplated death
and our animalness.222
In the most recent case to consider the execution process, the Court in
Baze v. Rees223 considered the constitutionality of Kentucky's three-drug
lethal injection method. The Plurality opinion, written by Chief Justice
Roberts, concluded that the petitioners were unable to show that the risk of
pain from the incorrect administration of the lethal injection protocol was
so substantial or imminent to constitute a cruel an unusual punishment. 224
Beyond the expected discussion of the legal standard, though, the Plurality
opinion spent little time on the mechanics of death or the suffering from
botched executions. The opinion, however, did discuss the chemicals used
in lethal injection and their purposes,225 and it did address some of peti-
tioners' arguments about alternative lethal injection methods.226 In the
seven written opinions in Baze v. Rees, some of the other Justices, such as
217. Gomez v. United States District Court, 503 U.S. 653 (1992).
218. Id. at 653.
219. Id. at 655-56 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens, like Justice Brennan, has been singled
out for his willingness to discuss the reality of death in the context of a termination of life support
case. See Louise Harmon, supra note 207, at 128.
220. Glass v. Louisiana, 471 U.S. 1080 (1985).
221. Id. at 1086 (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of petition for writ of certiorari).
222. Id. at 1086-93.
223. 128 S. Ct. 1520 (2008).
224. Id. at 1533-34.
225. Id. at 1534-36.
226. Id. at 1535. The Plurality addressed petitioners' claim that the second drug used in lethal
injection, pancuronium bromide, does little beyond suppressing the condemned's muscle movements
that might reveal problems in the administration of the drugs. The Plurality, however, noted that
pancuronium stops respiration and that the Commonwealth had an interest in preserving the "dignity of
the procedure" by eliminating convulsions and seizures that might be misperceived by witnesses as
meaning that the condemned is suffering. Id. at 1535. Justice Stevens countered that the minimal
interest in making witnesses feel comfortable is "vastly outweighed by the risk that the inmate is
actually experiencing excruciating pain that no one can detect." Id. at 1544 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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Justice Breyer and Justice Ginsburg, do devote some discussion to the
mechanics of death.227
In a concurring opinion, Justice Stevens appears most affected by the
reality of the infliction of death that is invoked by the thoughts about the
mechanics of execution. Early in his opinion he used a death word in a
context not used by the other Justices when he noted that "Kentucky may
well kill petitioners using a drug that it would not permit to be used on
their pets. 228  Instead of the clinical terms like "execute," he used the
harsher word to acknowledge that a state actually "kills." Thus, the re-
minders of death remain in the forefront of Justice Stevens's analysis, ra-
ther than being pushed into the subconscious. Then, it is not surprising,
that he used this consideration of the killing process to go further than he
ever did before to condemn the use of the death penalty overall.229
Justice Stevens began the opinion with a consideration of lethal injec-
tion, but then he proceeded to consider the fairness of the death penalty
process and the risks of error and risks of discrimination.23° Ultimately -
and surprisingly, he concluded that the death penalty itself violates the
Eighth Amendment and announced, "I have relied on my own experience
in reaching the conclusion that the imposition of the death penalty
represents 'the pointless and needless extinction of life with only marginal
contributions to any discernible social or public purposes. ,,231
Similarly, in some other execution method cases, lower courts have
paused executions through decisions that dwell on the process of inflicting
death.232 Recently, the Nebraska Supreme Court extensively considered
the effects of electrocution in holding that execution in the electric chair is
cruel and unusual punishment under the Nebraska Constitution.233 In
227. Id. at 1564-67 (Breyer, J., concurring) (discussing lethal injection studies); id. at 1567-72
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (discussing procedures used in different states). Also, Justice Thomas wrote
a concurring opinion where he discussed prior methods of execution and that argued that a method of
execution does not violate the Eighth Amendment unless "it is deliberately designed to inflict pain."
Id. at 1556 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Scalia's separate opinion responding to Justice Stevens
did not contemplate death at all, but Justice Scalia did join Justice Thomas's opinion. Id. at 1552-56
(Scalia, J., concurring).
228. Id. at 1541 (Stevens, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
229. See Linda Greenhouse, After a 32-Year Journey, Justice Stevens Renounces Capital Punish-
ment, NY TIMES, April 18, 2008, at A22.
230. Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1546-52.
231. Id. at 1552 (quoting Furman, 408 U.S. at 312 (White, J., concurring)).
232. See, e.g., Taylor v. Crawford, No. 05-4173-CV-C-FJG, 2006 WL 1779035 (W.D. Mo.
June 26, 2006) (staying executions in Missouri pending approval of lethal injection protocol); Morales
v. Tilton, 465 F. Supp. 2d 972 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (memorandum of intended decision and request for
response from defendants). Cf. Taylor v. Crawford, 487 F.3d 1072 (8th Cit. 2007) (lifting an injunc-
tion on lethal injection in Missouri and finding the procedure does not violate the Eighth Amendment).
Currently, the Nebraska Supreme Court is evaluating the constitutionality of the electric chair, the
exclusive method of execution in Nebraska. Robynn Tysver, Mata Ruling May Bring Lethal Injection
Debate, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD (NEBRASKA), Sept. 4, 2007 available at
http://www.omaha.com/index.php?u_page-=2798&usid = 10123052.
233. State v. Mata, 745 N.W.2d 229, 278 (Neb. 2008).
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reaching that conclusion, the Nebraska court extensively evaluated the
physical effects of death by electrocution, discussing brain function, the
likelihood that one's heart would restart, the likelihood that the condemned
would survive the electrocution, the types of burns that result, the risks
that the condemned will catch fire, and the sources of pain and suffer-
ing.234  As in some of the Supreme Court cases, other lower court opi-
nions sometimes focus on the pain leading up to death, but often the
judges generally do not contemplate more than that.235
Second, the category of capital cases where the Court has most consi-
dered a defendant's contemplation of death is the small group of cases
addressing competency to be executed .236 In both Ford v. Wainwright237
and Panetti v. Quarterman,238 the Justices considered to what extent the
Eighth Amendment requires a capital defendant to be able to contemplate
the reality of death before the defendant may be executed.
In a Plurality opinion in Ford, Justice Marshall wrote that the Eighth
Amendment bars execution of "one whose mental illness prevents him
from comprehending the reasons for the penalty or its implications. ", 2 39
Justice Marshall's opinion focused on the common law history of the ban,
noting, however, that "the reasons for the rule are less sure and less uni-
form than the rule itself." 240 Most of the possible reasons for requiring
competency to be executed focused on the fact that the execution of the
insane would not serve retribution or deterrence goals. But he briefly
mentioned one reason that focused on the contemplation of death: "Other
commentators postulate religious underpinnings: that it is uncharitable to
dispatch on offender 'into another world, when he is not of a capacity to
fit himself for it. "241
The Plurality opinion in Ford, however, did not establish a standard
for competence to be executed, and subsequent lower court opinions have
relied upon Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Ford for a legal stan-
234. Id. at 261-78.
235. See, e.g., Gray v. Lucas, 710 F.2d 1048, 1061 (5th Cir. 1983) (finding no Eighth Amend-
ment violation for execution by lethal gas because of a lack of evidence that "the pain and terror re-
sulting from death by cyanide gas is so different in degree or nature from that resulting from other
traditional modes of execution"); Morales, 465 F. Supp. 2d 978-81 Taylor, 487 F.3d 1072 at *3-7.
236. Unlike the cases involving the issue of competency to be executed, in cases involving mental-
ly retarded individuals and juveniles, the Court has focused the discussion on the responsibility of the
individuals for their acts in committing the crime, not on the individual's ability to contemplate death.
See, e.g., Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 338-40 (1988) (upholding the execution of the mentally
retarded); Roper, 543 U.S. 551 (2005)(holding it is unconstitutional to execute imnates who committed
the capital crime when they were under eighteen years old); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002)
(holding that it is unconstitutional to execute mentally retarded individuals).
237. 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
238. 127 S. Ct. at 2859.
239. 477 U.S. 417 (1986).
240. Id. at 407.
241. Id. (citation omitted).
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dard. Justice Powell stated that the Eighth Amendment "forbids the ex-
ecution only of those who are unaware of the punishment they are about to
suffer and why they are to suffer it. , 242  Thus the standard requires that
the condemned be aware of death.
Recently, the Court revisited the competency issue in Panetti, where
the defendant claimed that due to a mental illness he did not have a ration-
al understanding of the reasons for his execution. 243 Discussing the retri-
bution rationale for not executing incompetent inmates, the Court noted
that one might say that capital punishment is imposed so that the inmate
recognizes "at last the gravity of his crime."244 Although the Court did
not explain this reasoning further, the implication is that one purpose of
the death penalty is to make a defendant fully contemplate her or his own
mortality and what happens after one dies. Only by the conscious terror
of such contemplation, the Court implied, will condemned inmates under-
stand the harm they have caused and will justice be served.
Regarding the standard for competency to be executed, the Court in
Panetti confirmed that Ford allowed for inquiry into whether a defendant
245has a rational understanding of the state's reasons for the execution.
The Court found that the lower court erred because it did not consider the
defendant's claims that "he suffers from a severe, documented mental ill-
ness that is the source of gross delusions preventing him from compre-
hending the meaning and purpose of the punishment to which he has been
sentenced. , 246  As in Ford, however, the Panetti Court did not clearly
establish a rule for all competency determinations.247
Third, outside the context of execution method cases and competency
to be executed cases, the Justices may sometimes contemplate death close-
ly when they consider the overall constitutionality of the death penalty, as
Justice Brennan did in Furman.248
Another example of a Justice contemplating death in addressing the
constitutionality of the death penalty occurred in Callins v. Collins,249
242. Id. at.422 (Powell, J., concurring).
243. Panetti v. Dretke, 401 F. Supp. 2d 2862.
244. Id. at 2861.
245. Id. at 2862.
246. Id. The District Court had held that "the Fifth Circuit test for competency to be executed
requires the petitioner know no more than the fact of his impending execution and the factual predicate
for the execution." Panetti v. Dretke, 401 F. Supp. 2d 702, 711 (W.D. Tex. 2004).
247. Id. "Although we reject the standard followed by the Court of Appeals, we do not attempt to
set down a rule governing all competency determinations." Id. Although much of Justice Thomas's
opinion focused on procedural issues, he also disagreed with the Court regarding the standard. The
opinion, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia and Alito, argued that under Ford, a
defendant only needed to have actual knowledge, not rational understanding, of the reason for execu-
tion. Id. at 2873 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
248. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 288-91.
249. Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1143 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of
petition for writ of certiorari).
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when Justice Blackmun, after more than twenty years of upholding the
constitutionality of the death penalty, wrote that he would no longer do
SO.250 Although most of Justice Blackmun's opinion focused on the arbi-
trariness of the death penalty system, he chose to begin the opinion by
asking the reader to consider Bruce Callins as "a man, strapped to a gur-
ney, and seconds away from execution. " 25 1 Interestingly, Justice Black-
mun's announcement of his opposition to the death penalty, like Justice
Stevens's similar announcement fourteen years later in Baze, confronted
the reality of death by beginning with the consideration of a lethal injec-
tion and the "toxic fluid designed specifically for the purpose of killing
human beings. 252
In response to Justice Blackmun, Justice Scalia also asked the reader
to contemplate death and consider the death of victims of violent crime as
being horrible, whether quick or drawn OUt. 253 He stated that the victim in
the Callins case was killed "by a bullet suddenly and unexpectedly, with
no opportunity to prepare himself and his affairs, and left to bleed to
death. , 25 4 He mentioned the death in another case where a girl was raped
and killed by four men, concluding, "How enviable a quiet death by lethal
injection compared with that!"255
The comments by Justices Blackmun and Scalia were brief and not a
significant part of each analysis. But it is informative that the issues about
the contemplation and terror of death would come up on opinions contem-
plating the overall constitutionality of the death penalty.
Beyond these three categories of cases, the physical, mental, and spiri-
tual reality of death often seems on the sidelines in the Court's analysis of
capital cases. On the one hand, it makes sense from a legal analysis
standpoint to focus on the procedural issues at hand. But in light of the
recent studies showing that judges are more punitive when thoughts about
death are buried in the subconscious, terror management theory raises
concerns about possible bias in court decisions that avoid the full contem-
plation of death.
Considering terror management effects, it is not surprising that a rare
time when the Court contemplated the reality of death in Ford v. Wain-
250. "From this day forward, I no longer shall tinker with the machinery of death." Id. at 1145.
251. Id. at 1143.
252. Id. at 1143. See Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1542-43 (Stevens, J., concurring). It is also interesting
that both Justice Blaclmun and Justice Stevens in their opening paragraphs select the words "kill" and
"killing" instead of variations on the word "execution" in describing what the state is doing to the
condemned. Callins, 510 U.S. at 1143; Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1543.
253. Callins, 510 U.S. at 1142-43 (Scalia, J., concurring in denial of petition for writ of certiora-
ri).
254. Id. at 1142.
255. Id. at 1143. Similarly, in Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. at 812-16., the Court dwelled on
the suffering of the victim and held that victim impact evidence may be used against capital defen-
dants.
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wright, the Court excluded a class of individuals from execution. Also,
one sees the full consideration of the realities of death in some of the opi-
nions of Justices who were less punitive and against the death penalty,
such as in opinions by Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Ste-
vens. 256  Although one explanation is that these Justices were likely to
dwell on death details to support their position against the use of the death
penalty, their focus on the realities of death facing a defendant in decisions
against the death penalty is consistent with terror management theory.
When a judge fully confronts and considers the realities of death, rather
than pushing those thoughts to the subconscious, the judge will be less
punitive.
Judges in the appellate process may be more removed from reminders
of death than jurors in capital cases, and thus, it is possible that the effects
of mortality salience are less in the appellate setting. But the reverse may
be true. The study with judges that examined mortality salience and the
sentencing of prostitutes involved only written information, and the effects
of mortality salience were significant. 257  Because the mortality salience
effects occur when the reminders of death are relegated to the subcons-
cious, the effects from capital cases may be more pronounced on judges
reading a lower court record at their leisure rather than on judges and ju-
rors facing a barrage of intense reminders of death at the trial level.
Some studies, however, find that mortality salience increases fair
process concerns because fairness and the legal system are highly valued
by judges, who have devoted their lives to the legal system.258 When sub-
consciously reminded of their mortality, then, judges may actually cling
tighter to judicial fairness as their immortality device. Some studies of the
general population have noted an increase in fairness concerns following
mortality salience, 259 so it is interesting to contemplate the balance be-
tween the punitive and fairness effects that mortality reminders have upon
judges .260 Further experiments on these questions will provide more in-
sight.
256. Similarly, one scholar has argued, "Abolitionists . . . typically seek to grasp the reality of the
event, rather than mask what occurs with socially acceptable words. The use of euphemism in the
description of capital punishment tends to prolong the practice and make it palatable." Norman L.
Greene, The Context of Executive Clemency: Reflections on the Literature of Capital Punishment, 28
CAP. U. L. REv. 513, 530-31 (2000).
257. See discussion, supra, in Section II.
258. See supra Section II. See also Joel D. Lieberman & Bruce D. Sales, Jury Instructions, 6
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 587, 704 (2000) (noting studies that found that reminders of death in-
crease people's concerns regarding procedural fairness).
259. See, e.g., Arndt et al., supra note 94, at 424-25.
260. Some experts have noted the conflicting results from mortality salience in that sometimes the
decider becomes more punitive and at other times the decider is more motivated to follow legal guide-
lines. Alison Cook et al., supra note 110, at 407. The authors noted that "[pirevious terror manage-
ment research suggests that mortality salience effects are often swayed by salient components of an
individual's worldview. Id.
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B. Effects of the Death Penalty's Reminders of Death on Capital Defen-
dants and Others in the System
In addition to terror management theory's applicability to jurors dur-
ing the trial and to judges through trial and appeal, reminders of death also
may affect capital defendants, as well as other people within the system.
For example, capital jurors often experience emotional trauma and distress
that lasts long after the trial has ended.26' Others involved in the capital
punishment system experience similar emotional trauma, and terror man-
agement theory may assist in understanding the experience and aid in the
healing process.
Terror management theory may be useful to attorneys in understand-
ing their clients.262 For example, terror management effects may occur
after a defendant is sentenced to death. Between 1977 and July 2007,
there were 127 death row inmates who were executed after dropping their
appeals. 263 Death row inmates who waive post-conviction proceedings or
capital defendants who refuse to present mitigating evidence at sentencing
are often referred to as "volunteers" because they are volunteering for
death.2 6 Volunteers account for almost 13 % of all executions.265
Various theories exist for why some death row inmates choose to die,
including the claim that some inmates accept responsibility for their
crime.266 Some commentators have theorized that inmates may waive ap-
261. See, e.g., Leigh B. Bienen, Helping Jurors Out: Post-Verdict Debriefing for Jurors in Emo-
tionally Disturbing Trials, 68 IND. L.J. 1333, 1344-48 (1993) One juror noted that "Vietnam was a
piece of cake compared to that" in discussing being a juror and deciding someone's fate in a capital
case. Id. at 1347. See also Kate Darby Rauch, After the Verdict: Healing Jurors Who Have Been
Traumatized by Violent Testimony, WASH. POST, April 14, 1992, at Z10.
262. Becker's theories may also help explain some of the motivations behind why people commit
murders. These reasons currently are not considered by jurors in capital cases. Professor Samuel
Pillsbury has noted the connection between Becker's theories and an understanding of why serial killer
Ted Bundy committed capital murder. Samuel H. Pillsbury, Evil and the Law of Murder, 24 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 437, 470 (1990).
Like Satan and the vampire, Bundy saw the moral issues clearly. He understood the suffering
he caused and its wrongness in the eyes of mankind. He killed because murder provided self-
fulfillment. Bundy acted in order to achieve what Ernest Becker has called "significant immorality."
Like most serial killers he was a failure in most aspects of his life, but he found significance in killing.
He triumphed over other mortals; he became, for a few moments, God.
Id. (quoting ERNEST BECKER, ESCAPE FROM EVIL, supra note 27, at 24-26). One way to
address the reality of death is to try to triumph over it by controlling it and in some sense finding your
own immortality by killing others.
263. South Dakota's First Execution in 60 Years Involves Young "Volunteer," Death Penalty Info.
Ctr. Website, available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?did=2393&scid =64.
264. See, e.g., Kristen M. Dama, Comment, Redefining a Final Act.' The Fourteenth Amendment
and States' Obligation to Prevent Death Row Inmates From Volunteering to Be Put to Death, 9 U. PA.
J. CONST. L. 1083, 1083 (2007).
265. John Blume, Killing the Willing: "Volunteers, "Suicide and Competency, 103 MICH. L. REV.
939, 959 (2005).
266. Id. at 966 (finding that a questionnaire sent to attorneys who represented volunteers revealed
that in sixteen responses the attorneys said that acceptance of responsibility or acknowledgment of guilt
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peals because of "Death Row Syndrome" or "Death Row Phenomena": a
"depression caused by extended tenure and conditions on death row." 267
The possibility that the harsh conditions of death row could lead to the
decision to waive appeals was raised in a case before the European Court
of Human Rights, where a psychologist first used the term "Death Row
Syndrome. , 268
In a thorough evaluation of existing studies of volunteers, however,
Professor John Blume did not find evidence to support the prison condition
hypothesis.269 Instead, he found "important similarities between persons
who commit suicide and those who volunteer for execution." 270  Among
various factors, he found, "Mental illness and substance abuse are strongly
associated with suicide, and volunteers suffer from extremely high rates of
mental illness and substance abuse-clearly higher than the rates that pre-
vail among nonvolunteers. '' 271 Prof. Blume concluded with the argument
that a defendant should not be able to waive appeals when that decision is
primarily motivated by suicidal desires.272
Becker's theories help explain the connection between mental illness
and the fear of death, and his theories help explain why one under constant
threat of death would ultimately choose to control death by giving up any
appeals. In Denial of Death, he explained the connection between the
subconscious fear of death and mental illnesses -- like schizophrenia and
273depression -- that Prof. Blume linked to volunteers.
The reasoning of some volunteers who claim to accept their guilt and
agree to sacrifice their existence for their sins also may be explained by
terror management. The inmates overcome the fear of death by embrac-
was a factor in the inmate's decision to volunteer). Ultimately, however, the author concluded that
suicidal desires are a more likely explanation for the decisions to volunteer than acceptance of respon-
sibility. See id. at 968.
267. Stephen Blank, Note, Killing Time: The Process of Waiving Appeal: The Michael Ross Death
Penalty Cases, 14 J.L. & POL'Y 735, 749-50 n.109 (2006). The terms, "Death Row Syndrome" and
"Death Row Phenomena," are legal terms and not recognized by the American Psychiatric Associa-
tion. Id. at 752.
268. Id. at 753-55; Soering v. United Kingdom, 11 EUR. HUM. RTs. REV. 439 (1989). The Soer-
ing case involved an extradition hearing in the United Kingdom to extradite Jen Soering, a German
citizen, to face capital murder charges in Virginia. id. at 439. The European Court of Human
Rights, citing the possibility of Soering developing Death Row Syndrome, held that the long wait on
death row for the death penalty was a cruel and unusual penalty under the European Convention and
Soering could not be sentenced to death. See Blank, supra note 267, at 753-55. See also Pratt v.
Attorney General for Jamaica, 2 App. Cas. 1 (1994); Pratt and Morgan v. Jamaica, Communication
No. 210/1986, 225/1987 (April 7, 1987), U.N. Doc. CCPR/C.35/D.210/1986 and 225/1986 (consi-
dering actual examples of Death Row Syndrome).
269. Blume, supra note 265, at 965.
270. Id. at 968.
271. Id. In particular, he noted a high rate of schizophrenia, depression, bipolar disorder and post-
traumatic stress syndrome (PTSD) among volunteers, and those mental disorders also make one prone
to commit suicide. Id.
272. Id. at 985-86.
273. BECKER, DENIAL OF DEATH, supra note 27, at 210-21.
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ing it. And by embracing death, they attach themselves to something im-
mortal in the justice system. They comply with something larger than
themselves, justice, and achieve some sort of immortality with that con-
nection, as well as with the media coverage they receive in the days lead-
ing up to their execution.274
Beyond the capital defendants, attorneys, jurors, and judges, death
reminders from capital cases may have effects on other individuals within
the capital punishment system, as well as on the general public. Complex
emotions and fears are part of the mix affecting victims' families, prison
personnel, prison chaplains, governors, legislators, and others.275 Pat
Brown, a former Governor of California who oversaw thirty-six execu-
tions, wrote that each decision he had to make about a capital defendant
"took something out of me that nothing - not family or work or hope for
the future - has ever been able to replace." 276 A Sing Sing prison doctor
who attended one hundred and thirty-eight electrocutions quit when he
began feeling urges to join the condemned in the chair of death.2 77 Simi-
larly, a number of career executioners were "destroyed by their profes-
sion. "278
In addition to effects on people within the system, the use of the death
penalty has been shown to affect the general public, and these effects may
partly be explained by terror management theory. Support for Becker's
theory about the brutalizing effects of reminders of death is found in the
statistics that show an increase in murders that follow executions. Under
Becker's theories, the executioner's reminders of death and our own mor-
tality would lead members of society to be more hostile to outsiders and
increase violence. Consistent with that theory, a 1980 study by William
Bowers and Glenn Pierce of executions between 1907 and 1963 showed
that there were two or three murders more than the normal rate following
274. "[I]n guilt one gives with a melting heart and with choking tears because one is guilty, one is
transcended by the unspeakable majesty and superlativeness of the natural and cultural world, against
which one feels realistically humbled; by giving one draws oneself in to that power and merges one's
existence with it." BECKER, ESCAPE FROM EVIL, supra note 27, at 101-02.
275. In a law review article, Justice Brennan noted the "terrible stories" of those associated with
the crime and the death penalty in addition to the victim and the defendant: "An execution requires an
executioner, and they have their stories, as do the prison wardens, the spouses, and the children.
There are death row chaplains whose jobs are to minister to the condemned." Brennan, supra note
208, at 313.
276. EDMUND (PAT) BROWN, PUBLIC JUSTICE, PRIVATE MERCY xiii, 163 (1989).
277. Amos Squire, a doctor at Sing Sing who attended executions during 1914-1925, wrote that he
quit after he began to feel "a sudden, terrifying urge to rush forward and take hold of the man in the
chair, while the current was on." Tad Friend, Dean of Death Row: The Man Who Became the Face of
San Quentin, THE NEW YORKER, July 30, 2007, at 62, 68.
278. Patrick Cain, The Agony of the Executioner: How a Parkdale Man Became Our First Official
Hangman and Was Destroyed By It, TORONTO STAR, May 20, 2007, at D04. Canadian's first profes-
sional hangman John Radclive noted after the end of his career and shortly before his death that at
night when he lies down he sees the condemned he executed: "They haunt me and taunt me until I am
nearly crazy with an unearthly fear." Id.
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executions.279 Other similar studies also have found that executions in-
crease the number of murders.280
Besides Becker, others have anticipated the results of these studies
showing brutalization effects of capital punishment. In 1903, George Ber-
nard Shaw wrote, "Murder and capital punishment are not opposites that
cancel one another, but similars that breed their kind." 281 In fact, one of
the reasons that United States officials in the early Nineteenth Century
began advocating against public executions was the recognition that public
executions increased crimes.282
Even today, some of the debate about the death penalty has centered
on detrimental effects to individuals who participate in running the capital
punishment system as well as on society as a whole.283 Some supporters
of the death penalty argue that it serves a deterrent function. The argu-
ment that the death penalty may function as a deterrent is based on the
idea that the fear of death will have positive influences in causing potential
murderers to not kill. But the terror management experiments show that
the fear of death has potential to create evil instead of deterring evil.
Thus, reading in the morning paper that the state has killed someone
will remind the reader of death and perhaps later result in the reader being
hostile toward those who differ from the reader. The government's inten-
tional infliction of death reassures us that we belong to something larger
than ourselves that can control death, but it also reminds us of our own
mortality. Under terror management theory, those reminders of death
may provoke us to be less kind than we would otherwise be.
279. "They found that in New York within a thirty-day period following every execution, between
1907 and 1963, there were two or three murders over and above the expected rate." Michael Kroll,
The Write Stuff, in A PUNISHMENT IN SEARCH OF A CRIME: AMERICANS SPEAK OUT AGAINST THE
DEATH PENALTY 299, 302 (Ian Gray & Moira Stanley eds., 1989).
280. Joanna M. Shepherd, Deterrence Versus Brutalization: Capital Punishment's Differing Im-
pacts Among States, 104 MICH. L. REv. 203, 247-48 (2005) (concluding that "in the many states
where executions induce murders rather than deter them, executions cause an additional 250 murders
per year"); Jeffrey Fagan, Death and Deterrence Redux: Science, Law and Causal Reasoning on
Capital Punishment, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 255, 310-11 (2006). See also generally Donohue &
Wolfers, supra note 6 (2005) (discussing problems with the use of statistical deterrence studies in the
death penalty debate).
281. GEORGE BERNARD SHAW, MAN AND SUPERMAN 232 (2005). Albert Camus noted this con-
nection when he wrote about the guillotine: "It is a penalty, to be sure, a frightful torture, both physi-
cal and moral, but it provides no sure example except a demoralizing one. It punishes, but it forstalls
nothing; indeed it may even arouse the impulse to murder." ALBERT CAMUS, Reflections on the
Guillotine, in RESISTANCE, REBELLION AND DEATH 197 (Justin O'Brien trans., 1961). Further,
"[s]tatistics drawn up at the beginning of the century in England show that out of 250 who were
hanged, 170 had previously attended one or more executions. And in 1886, out of 167 condemned
men who had gone through the Bristol prison, 164 had witnessed at least one execution." Id. at 189.
282. LOUIS P. MASUR, RITES OF EXECUTION: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE TRANSFORMATION
OF AMERICAN CULTURE, 1776-1865 95 (1989).
283. See Kirchmeier, Let's Make a Deal, supra note 213, at 647-49 (discussing detrimental impact
of executions on victims, defendants' families, prison guards, governors and others).
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VII. How ATTORNEYS, JUDGES, AND EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGISTS
MAY USE TERROR MANAGEMENT STUDIES TO CONFRONT THE
EXISTENTIAL DEATH PENALTY 2"
Although further terror management experiments may reveal more
about how terror management works in the courtroom, there are several
things that attorneys may do to address the arbitrary existential influences
in capital cases. Below are some suggestions for (1) how attorneys and
judges may confront the existential death penalty; and (2) how terror man-
agement psychologists might focus further research.
A. Techniques for Attorneys and Judges to Address Terror Management
Effects Based Upon Current Research
Although the previous section explained that the subconscious fear of
death is partly responsible for many of the problems with our capital pu-
nishment system, attorneys and judges may attenuate mortality salience-
induced bias in cases. The main way for attorneys to address the subcons-
cious motivations contributing to the arbitrariness of the death penalty is
for attorneys to be aware of these existential effects, and further studies by
mental health experts will be useful.285
More specifically, attorneys may address the effects of mortality sa-
lience in capital cases in a number of ways. First, attorneys should con-
sider the death-denial effects in selecting jurors. Second, during the trial
stage, attorneys should address mortality salience and work to lessen its
impacts. Third, attorneys may fully embrace the fear of death by talking
about it openly. Fourth, defense attorneys need to be aware of death-
denial effects on their clients and the risk that they might become volun-
teers. Finally, the burden should not be only on defense attorneys to ad-
dress these issues. Prosecutors and judges have an interest in justice and
in eliminating arbitrary death sentences, so they too should take steps to
lessen the impact of mortality salience.
284. Although this article focuses on the effects of mortality salience in the courtroom, there are
likely effects outside the courtroom. Our subconscious, of course, works around the clock, and attor-
neys, as well as jurors, are likely affected by reminders of death. So attorneys and others with the
system may display effects of mortality salience in their work environments and their personal lives.
Such a discussion is beyond the scope of this article and would benefit from further experiment and
study.
285. "[Rjesearch further suggests that if education can supplant deeply rooted prejudices and
instead build tolerance as a core value of worldviews. . . . then perhaps the unfortunate reactions
toward those who are different can be attenuated. Moreover, focusing on understanding the basic
needs and fears that provoke such responses may direct inquiry to ways that can further ameliorate
these unfortunate consequences." Lieberman et al., supra note 33, at 547.
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1. Attorneys Should Address the Effects of Terror Management During
Jury Selection
Attorneys should address the terror management bias at the voir dire
stage by selecting jurors who are less likely to be subconsciously influ-
enced by reminders of death.2 86 For example, as discussed above, studies
show that individuals with high self-esteem are not threatened by other
beliefs. 87 Thus, the mortality salience reminders in capital cases would
have less impact on jurors with high self-esteem.
Although several studies have indicated that preexisting attitudes dis-
288closed at voir dire may be poor predictors of behaviors, some psycholo-
gists conclude that attitudes that relate to mortality salience and an indi-
vidual's ability to buffer death anxiety may be predictive of how they will
behave if put on a jury. 289  Existential psychologists have found that the
best worldviews to minimize ill effects of mortality salience "are ones that
value tolerance of different others, that are flexible and open to modifica-
tions, and that offer paths to self-esteem minimally likely to encourage
hurting others. 290
The suggestion to seek tolerant jurors is nothing revolutionary to de-
fense attorneys, but the self-esteem context given by the existential psy-
chologists - as well as continuing studies in the area - may further inform
the voir dire process so attorneys understand why such jurors are desired.
For example, one recent study found the most merciful of a group of death
qualified jurors tended "to be those who are more educated and those who
are more consistent about attending religious services." 291  Under terror
management theory analysis, such jurors would have stronger self-esteem
and a stronger immortality device to protect them from the fear of death.
Thus, they would be less likely to be affected by reminders of death, and
they would be less punitive than other jurors. So this study is consistent
with Becker's theories.
286. See Arndt et al., Terror Management in the Courtroom, supra note 94, at 430. Different
jurisdictions may have different limitations on voir dire, but many experts have noted how important it
is for attorneys to have access to jury information in capital trials. See, e.g., Symposium. Avoid Bald
Men and People with Green Socks? Other Ways to Improve the Voir Dire Process in Jury Selection, 78
CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1179, 1198-1201 (2003). See also Symposium. Probing "Life Qualification"
Through Expanded Voir Dire, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1209, 1209-11 (2001) (stating, "The conventional
wisdom is that most trials are won or lost in jury selection. If this is true, then in many capital cases,
jury selection is literally a matter of life or death.").
287. See supra notes and accompanying text.
288. See Arndt et al., Terror Management in the Courtroom, supra note 94, at 430.
289. See id.
290. Solomon et al, supra note 19, at 27. "Rigid, fundamentalist worldviews, whether Christian,
Islamic, fascist, communist, religious, or secular, are model opposites of such ideals." Id. at 27-28.
291. Theodore Eisenberg & Stephen P. Garvey, The Merciful Capital Juror, 2 OHIO ST. J. CRIM.
L. 165, 190(2004).
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Another way that attorneys may address the mortality salience prob-
lem in jury selection is to work to restructure the jury selection process
itself. Because jurors who favor the death penalty are more likely to find
defendants guilty than jurors who do not favor the death penalty, the death
qualification process should only be used when it is necessary. It should
be used to select the jurors who will decide the sentence, but not to select
the jurors for the guilt phase. Other legal scholars also have suggested
that different juries be used for each stage of a capital sentencing process
to address the problem that death qualified juries tend to be more punitive
292than other juries.
2. During Trial and Sentencing, Attorneys Should Work to Decrease
the Terror Management Impacts on Jurors
Once jurors are selected, attorneys should continue to work to lessen
the arbitrary influence of terror management. Psychologists have made
suggestions for attorneys to attenuate bias during a trial. These sugges-
tions include: use strategies that reduce experiential process and increase
analysis; 293 use strategies that prime tolerance, such as requesting judicial
instructions "that encourage fairness and strict legal adherence as a cogni-
tively accessible worldview motive;" 294 and use strategies that emphasize
similarities between the defendant and the jurors.295
Regarding the last suggestion, "previous research has shown that in
general, jurors are less punitive toward defendants who are similar to them
on factors such as race, religion, native language, or values." 296  Other
studies, however, have indicated that in some situations, stressing similari-
ties between the defendant and a juror could backfire where identification
with the defendant may threaten the juror's own sense of self-esteem. 97
For example, one study found that where evidence against a black defen-
dant was strong, a black juror on a jury with mainly white jurors would be
292. See, e.g., Rozelle, The Principled Executioner, supra note 1587at 781; Sam Kamin & Jeffrey
J. Pokorak, Death Qualification and True Bifurcation: Building on the Massachusetts Governor's
Council's Work, 80 IND. L. J. 131, 149-52 (2005); Sara Darehshor, et al., Empire State Injustice:
Based Upon a Decade of New Information, A Preliminary Evaluation of How New York's Death Pe-
nalty System Fails to Meet Standards for Accuracy and Fairness, 4 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y &
ETHics J. 85, 112-15 (2006).
293. One such strategy would be to request that the judge allow jurors to take notes and ask ques-
tions. Arndt et al., Terror Management in the Courtroom, supra note 94, at 430. "[S]tudies show
that symbolic worldview investments (e.g., prejudice toward those who disparage one's central beliefs)
found after MS [mortality salience] do not occur when participants are induced to process information
in a rational mode but are quite robust when participants are induced to process information in a more
experiential, intuitive manner." Arndt et al., Understanding the Cognitive, supra note 73, at 35, 38.
294. Solomon et al., supra note 19, at 13, 27.
295. Arndt et al., Terror Management in the Courtroom, supra 94, at 430.
296. Id. (citation omitted).
297. Id. at 430-31.
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more likely to convict a black defendant than a white juror would.29 8
Thus, especially "when people have been reminded of death and are there-
fore in need of strong anxiety buffers," then "increased identification be-
tween the jurors and defendant may at times backfire and lead jurors to try
to psychologically deny such similarities. "299
One way to lessen the impact of terror management effects is to try to
prevent jurors from connecting themselves to the victim in a way that will
make them think of their own death. But under Payne v. Tennessee,
courts have allowed the use of victim impact evidence that likely functions
as mortality salience for jurors.300 Hearing family members of the victim
discuss their loss will certainly result in jurors relating to the family and
the victim, and they may likely contemplate their own death. The terror
management psychologists should perform further studies in this area to
see whether victim impact statements function as mortality salience. But it
seems reasonable to assume the use of such evidence does cause terror
management effects, especially because most jurors are likely to share
more traits and worldviews with victims than with the defendants.
The current Supreme Court does not find a constitutional violation
when victim impact evidence is introduced, but the decision whether to
actually use such evidence is left to state legislatures and individual prose-
cutors. An ethical prosecutor, perhaps, should consider the relevance of
such evidence and its likelihood of contributing to an arbitrary sentence.3 °1
And if the prosecutor introduces such evidence, a defense attorney will
have to consider how to address the mortality salience impact of such tes-
timony.
3. Another Approach that Attorneys Might Take Is to Directly Con-
front Terror Management to Prevent the Death Reminders From Re-
sorting to the Subconscious
Failing to eliminate mortality salience reminders, attorneys might fully
embrace the death reminders and terror management. Mortality salience
only has the impact of making jurors more punitive if the death reminder
is suppressed in the juror's subconscious. As discussed above, if one con-
sciously thinks about death, one is not more punitive toward others. As
noted earlier, Ernest Becker explained that whatever one "does on this
298. Id. at 431.
299. Id.
300. See discussion supra Section II.
301. See, e.g., Symposium. Notions of Symmetry and Self in Death Penalty Jurisprudence (With
Implications for the Admissibility of Victim Impact Evidence), 15 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 471, 516-17
(2004) (arguing that the introduction of victim impact evidence by the prosecutor introduces additional
arbitrariness in the capital sentencing procedures and that prosecutors should be allowed to instead
introduce a different response to mitigating evidence).
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planet has to be done in the lived truth of the terror of creation, of the
grotesque, of the rumble of panic underneath everything. Otherwise it is
false." 30 2  His advice about living life can apply in the courtroom. The
results of the studies are consistent with conclusions from existential philo-
sophers that a direct acknowledgment of those things we fear - anxiety,
uncertainty, and death - allows us to live better lives.3 °3 If the fear of
death is openly discussed, the impact of subconscious fears may be mini-
mized. More ideally, the impact of subconscious fears would be further
minimized if attorneys may present evidence regarding the effects of mor-
tality salience and terror management.
Appellate defense attorneys should consider similar techniques to pre-
vent appellate judges from relegating thoughts of death to the subcons-
cious. One scholar has noted that one of the best capital appellate attor-
neys, Prof. Anthony Amsterdam, used a strategy in Furman to emphasize
what was at stake and the Court's responsibility. 3°4 This approach of mak-
ing the judges consciously aware of death may help lessen the terror man-
agement influences.
Attorneys should also confront the terror management effects occur-
ring outside the courtroom. In dealing with clients who are volunteers or
potential volunteers, attorneys -- in consultation with mental health experts
-- should consider the impact of the ongoing threat of death on the client.
As discussed above, death-row phenomena and mental illness may contri-
bute to decisions to voluntarily be put to death. As Albert Camus, an ear-
ly existentialist philosopher, stated, "There is but one truly serious philo-
sophical problem, and that is suicide." 30 5 Further studies should focus on
the impact of the constant threat of death on the subconscious.
4. Judges and Prosecutors Should Also Work to Lessen the Arbitrary
Terror Management Effects
The burden to minimize the mortality salience effects in capital cases
should not fall only upon the defense attorneys. Judges and prosecutors
have an obligation to minimize arbitrary influences on the decision-making
process, so they should also work to minimize terror management influ-
ences.
302. BECKER, DENIAL OF DEATH, supra note 27, at 283-84.
303. See Leonard L. Martin et al., The Roar of Awakening: Mortality Acknowledgment as a Call to
Authentic Living, in HANDBOOK OF EEP, supra note 19, at 435.
304. Liebman, Slow Dancing With Death, supra note 188, at 107-12. The Furman lawyers "ren-
dered the Court helpless to retreat from the violence to an observer's outpost and maximized the
judicial deployer's discomfort and need to justify the violence or, if not, overthrow it." Id. at 111.
305. ALBERT CAMUS, THE MYTH OF SISYPHUS 441 (1955), reprinted in BASIC WRITINGS OF
EXISTENTIALISM 441 (Gordon Marino ed. 2004). "Judging whether life is or is not worth living
amounts to answering the fundamental question of philosophy." Id.
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Terror management researchers advise that judges should give direct
instructions to jurors with strict legal definitions and with directions to
analyze the evidence in the case.306  Although judges ordinarily give in-
structions to guide jurors to follow the law, especially in capital trials,
judges should be aware of the arbitrary terror management influences as
they craft their jury instructions. The instructions need to be especially
clear because non-TMT studies have found that jurors often misunderstand
or do not follow the law. As one scholar has concluded, "The scientific
data on jury behavior, particularly the research that has been conducted
since the Furman decision, indicates that we should exercise more rather
than less control over capital juries."30 7  Perhaps more studies by the ter-
ror management experimental psychologists can give more insight into the
effectiveness of specific jury instructions to limit the mortality salience
effects.
In addition to giving clear instructions, trial judges should consider al-
lowing jurors to take notes and ask questions .308 Terror management stu-
dies show that strategies that encourage analysis and the rational
processing of information decreases terror management effects compared
to when one processes information in a more intuitive manner.3°9
Appellate judges too should be aware of terror management influences
in deciding cases. As discussed earlier, appeals are ideal incubators for
such influences, and judges who at least aware of the possibilities for such
influences are less likely to be subject to mortality salience.
Therefore, the goal of attorneys and judges seeking a fairer death pe-
nalty should be to lessen the impact of terror management effects. De-
fense attorneys need to be aware of the impact and try to lessen the impact
of death reminders on the jury, because such reminders can contribute to
arbitrary death sentences. But judges and prosecutors also should educate
themselves to try to lessen the role of terror management in order to seek
justice and a fairer death penalty system.
306. Arndt et al., Terror Management in the Courtroom, supra note 94, at 430. Also, "reducing
cognitive demands by allowing jurors to take notes, utilize case notebooks, and ask questions may
facilitate their ability to process information and thus reduce the experiential and heuristic processing
that tends to result." Id. Another scholar has observed that judicial instruction may help curb jurors'
emotions in deciding cases. Neal Feigenson, supra note, 68 BROOK. L. REV. at 997.
307. Jose Felipe Anderson, When the Wall Has Fallen: Decades of Failure in the Supervision of
Capital Juries, 26 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 741, 779 (2000) (emphasis added). See also Jeremy A. Blu-
menthal, Law and Emotions: The Problems of Affective Forecasting, 80 IND. L.J. 155, 191-92 (2005)
(noting that additional instructions from judges or attorneys are necessary to alleviate some of emo-
tional bias resulting from victim impact evidence).
308. Arndt et al., Terror Management in the Courtroom, supra note 94, at 430.
309. Arndt et al., Understanding the Cognitive, supra note 73, at 38.
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B. Suggestions for Further Experimental Terror Management Studies
Attorneys, judges and prosecutors may find further guidance from ad-
ditional studies by the experimental existential psychologists. Several
types of studies would be helpful.
First, although the current set of studies strongly support the conclu-
sion that death penalty trials provide adequate mortality salience for terror
management effects, additional studies should be done to determine
whether the mortality salience of focusing on the death of other people
may have the same effects as the experiments where the mortality salience
has focused on reminders of the subject's death. Although some studies
have examined the effects of different types of prompts, more studies fo-
cusing on how reminders of death work in the legal setting would be in-
formative.
Second, studies should focus on the terror management effects of vic-
tim impact evidence. Testimony by a family member about the impact of
the victim's death seems likely to connect with jurors and remind them of
their own mortality, but further study on how such testimony works as
mortality salience would be useful.
Third, the experimental existential psychologists have found two ef-
fects from mortality salience that contrast in the legal setting: (1) the re-
sult that some individuals become more punitive and (2) the result that
some individuals are more likely to cling to and follow legal standards.
One question that arises is how to determine which individuals will be-
come more punitive and which will be more likely to follow legal stan-
dards. It seems likely that those who have high regard for the law would
be more likely to cling to the law when reminded of death, and thus, con-
sidering career choices, judges might be more likely to cling to the law
when reminded of death than most jurors. In the prostitution experiment
with the Tucson judges, however, those judges became more punitive
when reminded of death. Some studies have already been done in this
area, but additional experiments to delineate the two contrasting effects
would provide further understanding to the terror management effects."o
In evaluating the interaction between increased punitiveness and an in-
creased desire to follow the law, the terror management psychologists
should consider that in some situations, these two effects may combine to
make judges and jurors even more punitive. For example, a judge who
normally is against the death penalty might feel forced by law to uphold
death sentences. In fact, a number of judges who are opposed to capital
punishment have voted to uphold death sentences.31 Thus, reminders of
310. See, e.g., Lieberman et al., supra note 33, at 550-51.
311. See, e.g., Kirchmeier, Another Place Beyond Here, supra note 2, at 32-36 (discussing several
state and federal judges who have been critical of the death penalty but who vote to uphold capital
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death might lead some to use the immortality device of the law as a tool to
be punitive against outsiders.
Fourth, studies should examine the difference between a trial setting
and an appellate setting for terror management purposes. An appellate
setting may create greater terror management effects because it seems
closest to the setting of the experiments that have been done, where sub-
jects read about reminders of death and were given a chance for the re-
minders to sink into the subconscious. A question exists, though, of
whether the types of reminders in capital cases will create more of a mor-
tality salience effect in trial settings, with live testimony, or in appellate
settings, where the judges read about the evidence.
Fifth, studies should examine possible ways to lessen the terror man-
agement effects in capital cases. One place to begin would be further ex-
amination of some of the suggestions for attorneys and judges discussed in
this article. For example, experiments with different types of jury instruc-
tions might provide some insight into what types of instructions best coun-
ter the terror management effects in capital cases. Further experiments
might also help reveal whether or not the approach of directly discussing
death will counter the punitive effects of mortality salience.
Finally, studies should examine the terror management effects that oc-
cur on both families of murder victims and on capital defendants. An un-
derstanding of these effects might aid families in healing and decrease the
number of volunteers.
The studies about how terror management works in the courtroom
would not be only about giving new tactics to attorneys. At the least,
these studies will help attorneys and judges eliminate some of the arbitrary
factors that arise in capital cases. At the most, additional terror manage-
ment studies on defendants may also reveal information about the causes
of violence, which would further inform the capital sentencing process.
More optimistically, such knowledge and further education may help pre-
vent violence in society.
sentences). Justices Blackmun upheld death sentences for more than twenty years before deciding to
vote against every death sentence during his final term. Id. at 27. In Baze v. Rees, Justice Stewart
followed stare decisis to concur in rejecting a challenge to Kentucky's lethal injection procedure even
as he reasoned he believed that the death penalty was unconstitutional. Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1552. As
Justice Powell neared his own death, he regretted his votes to condemn capital defendants. See JOHN
C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR.: A BIOGRAPHY 451 (1994); John C. Jeffries, Jr., A
Change of Mind that Came Too Late, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 1994, at A23.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
"[1ff we know that evil takes human form in oppressors and hangmen,
then we could at least try to make our hatreds . . . intelligent and in-
formed. ,312
Near the end of the movie Eraser, bad guy Robert Deguerin (James
Caan) and his colleagues appear to be escaping justice as they walk out of
a court hearing. They get in a limousine, laughing at how they will beat
the system. After a short drive, the limo driver stops the vehicle, locks
the passengers in the limo, and flees the car. The limo phone rings. It is
a call from the hero, John Kruger, played by Arnold Schwarzenegger,
who tells Deguerin, "You've just been erased." We see Schwarzenegger
overlooking the limo, which is parked at an intersection at a train cross-
ing. A train comes along and destroys the limo and kills its occupants,
thus bringing justice to the bad men. A few minutes later when Schwar-
zenegger is asked what happened to the bad guys, he deadpans, "They
caught a train. , 313 The end.
Almost a decade after the movie was released, the actor who played
the hero in Eraser was the governor of California and facing the real life-
and-death decision regarding whether to grant clemency to Stanley "Too-
kie" Williams on California's death row. In his "Statement of Decision"
addressing the clemency request, Gov. Schwarzenegger noted that Wil-
liams, a co-founder of the gang the Crips, had written books and spoken
out against gang violence.314 But Williams did not admit to the murders of
which he was convicted, so the governor concluded, "Without an apology
and atonement for these senseless and brutal killings there can be no re-
demption. "315 Gov. Schwarzenegger denied clemency, and Williams was
"erased" that evening after midnight.316
We pay money and enjoy watching Arnold Schwarzenegger send the
unarmed movie murderer James Caan to his death in a locked limo. We
gain some pleasure from such movies; otherwise movies where the hero
brings a violent reckoning on evil would not be so popular. The movies
protect us from our subconscious fear of death by creating an illusion both
that death can be controlled and that death comes only to those who de-
312. BECKER, ESCAPE FROM EVIL, supra note 27, at 145.
313. ERASER (Warner Bros. Pictures 1996).
314. See Govenor Arnold Schwarzenegger, Statement of Decision: Request for Clemency by
Stanley Williams,
http://pdftohtml.markoer.org/pdf2htnil.php?url =http%3A%2F%2Fwww.governor.ca.gov%2Fgovsite
%2Fpdf%2Fpress-release_2005%2FWilliamsClemencyDecision.pdf (last visited Dec. 12, 2005).
315. Id. at 5.
316. Associated Press, Convicted Killer Williams Put to Death in Calif, MSNBC News Website,
http:lwww.msnbc.msn.com/id/104486721.
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serve it. Redemptive violence appears to heal us, and it gives the illusion
of control over our world and over death. 317  Thus, we enjoy watching
violent movies and feel good as long as the bad people get killed in the
end.318
These same motivations are at work in the application of the death pe-
nalty, and they help explain why a majority of people support the death
penalty and supported the execution of Tookie Williams. 319 The subcons-
cious fear of death not only affects what movies we enjoy but also how we
conduct our lives and our basic belief systems that we choose and con-
struct. If these motivations affect our lives, they also affect our roles as
jurors, attorneys and judges. In capital cases, that influence then affects
the determination of whether a capital defendant lives or dies.
Because these motivations affect humans in numerous areas of our
lives and in our decision-making, one might view the results of terror
management studies in despair.32° Subconscious influences and motiva-
tions affect our lives and make the legal system arbitrary and unfair, espe-
cially in cases where life is at stake. What we created to be rational is
irrational. And the aspiration for a solution to the arbitrariness problem is
hopeless because these influences have existed since human beings first
gained intelligence to contemplate their mortality. The playwright Eugene
lonesco wrote, "As long as we are not assured of immortality, we shall
never be fulfilled, we shall go on hating each other in spite of our need for
mutual love. ,321
But Ernest Becker, like many of the existential philosophers, had
hope.322 The hope for humans to overcome their cruelties is in education
across cultures and across disciplines. Similarly, in the courtroom, attor-
neys, judges, and psychologists must confront the terror management ef-
fects head on, just as humans may embrace life by acknowledging their
mortality and their fears. Thus, attorneys and judges need to understand
terror management and consider the suggested strategies in this Article,
while the terror management psychologists should continue to study the
effects of the subconscious fear of death in the legal setting.
317. See generally WINK, supra note 12, at 42-62.
318. See BECKER, ESCAPE FROM EVIL, supra note 27, at 117 (quoting Hugh Duncan stating,
"[W]e cannot become humane until we understand our need to visit suffering and death on others").
319. Death penalty supporter Professor Robert Blecker has explained the feeling this way: The
.worst of the worst". . . "deserve to die. I know that. I feel certain; and those two words are crucial.
I feel certain, therefore, I am certain. Feeling - emotion - informed emotion - is very much part of a
jurisprudence that is necessary and sufficient for the death penalty." Symposium, Rethinking the
Death Penalty: Can We Define Who Deserves Death?, 24 PACE L. REV. 107, 123-24 (2003).
320. In Ecclesiastes, King Solomon wrote, "It seems so tragic that everyone under the sun suffers
the same fate [death]. That is why people are not more careful to be good. Instead, they choose their
own mad course, for they have no hope. There is nothing ahead but death anyway" Ecclesiastes 9:3
(New Living Translation).
321. BECKER, ESCAPE FROM EVIL, supra note 27, at 136.
322. See, e.g., id. at 145.
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In Escape from Evil, Ernest Becker explained that "[t]he logic of kill-
ing others in order to affirm our own life unlocks much that puzzles us in
history, much that with our modern minds we seem unable to compre-
hend. " 323 The logic of killing also can unlock much that puzzles us in
law. The law, as a practice concerned with fairness and justice, should
embrace the science of humans and use the knowledge of the existential
influences affecting lawmakers, judges, juries and attorneys. Psycholo-
gists need to continue studying the effects of reminders of death, and at-
torneys must educate themselves and use the information wisely as long as
humans inflict the existential death penalty.
323. Id. at 110.
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